

2011 EU-Wide Stress Test

Objectives, outcome and recommendations

16 July 2011

European Banking Authority

European System of Financial Supervision

Why the stress test?

What the stress test exercise is about:

- Assess resiliency of large sample of EU banks (90 institutions in 21 countries) against an adverse but <u>plausible</u> macroeconomic scenario towards a 5% CT1 threshold relatively strong benchmark
- Offer unprecedented transparency on EU bank disclosure including on sovereign risk -- aiming to help market confidence and increase degree of comparability (3,200 data points vs. 149 last year)
- Provide a relevant additional tool to help national supervisors assess the prudential risk of their banks in a pan-EU perspective and to take appropriate remedial measures on a more timely basis

What the stress test results are <u>not</u> about:

- Capture fully all financial and business risks in EU banking today
- Assume absolute worst-case scenarios aiming to cover extreme tail risk including on sovereign risk
- Force-rank EU banks or banking systems in terms of capital positions or other financial or nonfinancial metrics

Outcome of the stress test: without 2011 capital raising

End 2010: EUR1trn CT1 and 8.9% weighted-average CT1R:

Adverse outcome w/o Jan-April 2011 capital raising:

- 20 banks below 5% CT1
- EUR25bn capital deficit below 5%
- 14 banks in the 5%-6% CT1R range
- CT1R from 8.9% to 7.4%

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	2010	2012	< 2%	< 3%	< 4%	< 5%	< 6%	< 7%	< 8%	< 9%	< 10%	> 10%
AT	8.2%	7.6%	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
BE	11.4%	10.2%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
СҮ	7.7%	4.8%	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
DE	9.4%	6.8%	0	0	1	0	2	2	3	1	0	3
DK	9.8%	10.8%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
ES	7.4%	6.5%	4	0	3	2	7	2	0	3	2	2
FI	12.2%	11.6%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
FR	8.4%	7.5%	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0
GB	10.1%	7.6%	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0
GR	10.2%	5.7%	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	0
HU	12.3%	13.6%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
IE	6.2%	-0.1%	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT	7.4%	6.5%	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	0
LU	12.0%	13.3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MT	10.5%	10.4%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
NL	10.6%	9.4%	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
NO	8.3%	9.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
PL	11.8%	12.2%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PT	7.1%	5.2%	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
SE	9.0%	9.5%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
SI	5.7%	4.2%	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	8.9%	7.4%	7	0	8	5	14	13	10	10	6	17


Outcome of the stress test: with 2011 capital raising

- Adverse outcome with Jan-April 2011 capital raising:
 - 8 banks below 5% CT1
 - EUR2.5bn capital deficit below 5%
 - 16 banks fall in the 5%-6% CT1R range
 - CT1R from 8.9% to 7.7%

Adverse scenario

	2010	2012	< 2%	< 3%	< 4%	< 5%	< 6%	< 7%	< 8%	< 9%	< 10%	> 10%
AT	8.2%	7.6%	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
BE	11.4%	10.2%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
СҮ	7.7%	5.7%	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
DE	9.4%	6.8%	0		0	0	2	4	2	1	1	2
DK	9.8%	11.9%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
ES	7.4%	7.3%	0	0	3	2	7	5	1	3	2	2
FI	12.2%	11.6%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
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GB	10.1%	7.6%	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0
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HU	12.3%	13.6%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
IE	6.2%	9.8%	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
IT	7.4%	7.3%	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	0
LU	12.0%	13.3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
МТ	10.5%	10.4%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
NL	10.6%	9.4%	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
NO	8.3%	9.0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
PL	11.8%	12.2%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PT	7.1%	5.7%	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
SE	9.0%	9.5%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1
SI	5.7%	6.0%	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Total	8.9%	7.7%	1	0	3	4	16	18	11	12	7	18

Evolution and drivers of CT1





Evolution of CT1R (baseline vs. adverse scenarios)


Drivers of CT1 evolution




CT1R trends for top-30 vs. bottom-60 banks









Recommendations for follow-up action

Banks with CT1R below 5% under adverse scenario:


- National supervisors to request the respective banks to present plan by 15 October 2011 to restore CT1 to at least 5%
- Agreed-upon remedial measures will have to be implemented by end-2011 (with flexibility allowed only if justified by market conditions or required procedures)
- Banks with CT1R above but close to 5% under adverse scenario and with sizeable exposures to stressed sovereigns:
 - National supervisors to request remedial action plan by 15 October 2011
 - Agreed-upon remedial measures to be fully implemented by 15 April 2012
 - National supervisors of the respective banks to provide detailed overviews of remedial measures to the EBA by 31 October 2011
 - Upon review of the measures the EBA will issue reports in February and June 2012 on the implementation of these recommendations

• Significant challenges remain for all EU banks in view of the adverse sovereign situation


- National authorities in countries currently in IMF-EU programmes are strengthening the capital levels of homecountry banks and in many cases are setting capital standards above that of the EU-wide stress test.
- At the same time they take steps to extend funding maturities, increase liquidity buffers, and develop contingency plans

Net interest income and funding costs

 Adverse scenario assumes rising rates pushing funding costs upwards more than asset yields: net interest income falls below 2009 level




Drivers of funding cost increase




Pre-provision income and impairment provisions


- Impairment provisions amount to ca. EUR400bn for 2011-12 (adverse) –level comparable to 2009 (worst year of the crisis)
- In adverse scenario pre-provision income falls behind new impairment provisions flow



Default and loss rates


- Default rates sensitive to macroeconomic scenarios (baseline vs. adverse)
- Provisions for sovereigns and financial institutions determined to a large extent by the EBA's additional guidance






Default rates by portfolio

- Dispersion of default rates is particularly evident for the Retail SME, CRE and Corporate portfolios
- In general wide dispersion of default rates across banks



Risk-weighted assets and PD/LGD dispersion patterns

 Adverse scenario: RWA grow 14% -- due solely to higher IRB risk weights particularly for defaulted assets and securitization in banking book




- EBA's analysis shows significant dispersion in PD and LGD parameters (both starting and stressed levels)
- Further regulatory analysis should reveal more details on commonalities and differences in IRB method implementation across EU banks

Sovereign exposures: impairment recognition

In June 2011 the EBA issued additional guidance on sovereign and financial institutions exposure risk:

- Trading book: market risk haircuts
 - Reflect both widening sovereign spreads and interest rate movements in the adverse scenario
 - Banking book: sovereign exposures treated as another credit risk
 - PDs linked to external ratings: lowest non-default rating (CCC-equivalent) benchmarked to a 36.15% PD (based on rating agencies' corporate rating migration matrices)
 - LGD of 40% considered as appropriate by the EBA for sovereigns
 - 36.15% PD and 40% LGD lead to a 15% expected loss (EL)

Sovereign exposures



Aggregate EAD Greek sovereign debt was EUR98bn (end 2010):

- Sixty-seven percent held by home-country banks
- In the case of the sovereign debt of Ireland and Portugal it is also home-country banks that are majority holders (61% Ireland and 63% Portugal)
- The three countries' banks should have capital shortfalls covered with backstop mechanisms such as IMF-EU support packages
- Aside from impact of direct exposures there are second-order effects: negative market sentiment on stressed sovereigns impacts exposed banks' (i) market funding costs and availability, (ii) share price and capital generation capacity, and (ii) business and counterparty profile



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