

EUROPEAN ECONOMY

Occasional Papers 203 | December 2014

Infrastructure in the EU: Developments and Impact on Growth



European Commission

Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs

Infrastructure in the EU:

Developments and Impact on Growth

ABBREVIATIONS

Countries

EA	Euro area
NEA	Non Euro area
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
EL	Greece
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
MT	Malta
NL	The Netherlands
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
UK	The United Kingdom

Graphs/table unit

Bn	Billion
Mn	Million
MWh	Megawatt hour
MW	Megawatt
Pkm	Passenger-kilometres
Tkm	Tonne-kilometres

Other abbreviations

WEF	World Economic Forum
CEER	Council of European Energy Regulator
GFCF	Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Pp	Percentage point
SAIDI	System Interruption Average Duration Index
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Network

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The economic and financial crisis resulted in a sharp decrease in both private and public investment in the EU. Stimulus efforts were put in place right at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, which resulted in support for infrastructure investment worth about EUR 32 billion (0.25 % of EU GDP) ⁽¹⁾, over 2009 and 2010, but these measures subsequently stalled as the crisis wore on and governments decreased investment as part of their efforts to strengthen public finances.

Today, investment needs are high in areas such as research, innovation and ICT which are important drivers of growth and competitiveness. However, there are also arguments to suggest that Europe should invest in energy and transport infrastructure. Energy and transport infrastructure play a vital role in the integration and efficiency of the EU's internal market. Moreover, they are central to the EU's strategic transformation towards a low-carbon economy over the medium-long run. Investment in cross-border energy infrastructure is also needed to improve the EU's energy security and the functioning of the energy market. The EU's energy and transport infrastructure investment needs are expected to remain high in the near future.

This report analyses the macroeconomic impact of infrastructure development in the EU, focusing on inland transport and energy. It also assesses infrastructure investment patterns in Member States, before and after the economic crisis.

Over the last four decades, all Member States have expanded their transport and energy infrastructure networks. Since the mid-1990s, the development of road infrastructure has increased significantly and in some cases has exceeded the growth in road traffic (freight and passenger). Railway infrastructure has grown more slowly as trains have been losing market share in both passenger and freight traffic. The expansion of electricity infrastructure, however, has increased in line with electricity consumption.

Despite these positive developments, the availability and quality of infrastructure still varies considerably across the EU. The difference in the quality and availability of infrastructure in older and newer Member States has narrowed and reflects the catching up of these countries. In some older Member States, the quality of infrastructure has deteriorated due to insufficient maintenance spending and the ageing of networks. Cross-border transport and energy connections, which are vital to make the EU's internal market work, remain insufficient, particularly when it comes to railways and electricity. Building these missing interconnections to achieve a fully interconnected internal market could contribute to economic growth.

The report confirms that there is a positive relationship between the growth of transport and electricity infrastructure and economic growth. Policies that promote spending in these areas have a positive impact on growth, provided they do not create excess capacity, as overprovision of infrastructure has been shown to create inefficiencies by diverting resources away from more productive investments.

Member States have different infrastructure needs and increased investment in those sectors should take account of their investment pattern before and after the crisis. Analysis of recent infrastructure investment patterns in the Member States reveals signs of underinvestment in some countries. In the core countries of the euro area, there are indications of low investment in both road and rail infrastructure so boosting investments in these network would be justified. In the euro area periphery, there seems to be an adjustment following a period of high investment in roads. In the newer Member States, investment in both road and rail infrastructure has been higher than expected, with a sustained increase in investment that corresponds to their need to catch up with the rest of the EU. In most of these countries, the stock of infrastructure is still lower than the EU average. Investment in energy across the EU has been dynamic in most Member States, reflecting the shift to renewable and low-carbon energy encouraged by the EU's climate and energy strategy.

⁽¹⁾ European Commission (2009).

Increased investment in infrastructure can have a positive impact on growth, provided it is well targeted. Evidence suggests that Member States in which the stock of infrastructure is low, or has suffered from underinvestment, could benefit from higher infrastructure investment. To meet the EU's policy goals, considerable investment will be needed in energy infrastructure but such investment decisions are largely in the hands of the private sector and need to take place in well-designed markets ⁽²⁾. This paper by no means provides a blanket justification for indiscriminating public investment in infrastructure. Targeted public infrastructure investment can be very valuable in some cases but must take into account macroeconomic conditions, including fiscal constraints and the need to increase private financing.

⁽²⁾ European Economy (2014c).

CONTENTS

1. Introduction	11
2. Infrastructure in the EU: stylised facts	13
2.1. Introduction	13
2.2. Infrastructure provision in Member States: 2001-2011	13
2.3. Evolution of the quality of infrastructure in member States: 2001-2011	14
2.4. Infrastructure Needs: 2011-2030	17
3. Assessing the relationship between infrastructure and growth in the EU: an empirical investigation	19
3.1. Introduction	19
3.2. Evidence from the literature	19
3.2.1. Estimation methods	19
3.2.2. Data challenges: monetary or physical values?	19
3.2.3. Overview of empirical studies	20
3.3. Model	23
3.4. Data	23
3.5. Results	23
4. Assessing recent investment patterns in the EU	25
4.1. Introduction	25
4.2. Investment and maintenance spending during the crisis in the EU	25
4.3. Assessing investment patterns in the EU: Methodological approach	25
4.4. Data and specification	26
4.5. Investment patterns in Member State groups: Comparison in the light of macro-economic trends	28

5. Concluding remarks	33
References	34
Appendix 1 Literature Review	38
Appendix 2 Building an infrastructure database	40
Appendix 3 Methodology on establishing the relationship between infrastructure and growth	42
Appendix 4 Methodology of identifying under- and overinvestment analysis	46
Annex 1 Country fiches	49
1. Belgium	50
2. Bulgaria	52
3. The Czech Republic	54
4. Denmark	56
5. Germany	58
6. Estonia	60
7. Ireland	62
8. Greece	64
9. Spain	66
10. France	68
11. Croatia	70
12. Italy	72
13. Cyprus	74
14. Latvia	76
15. Lithuania	78
16. Luxembourg	80
17. Hungary	82
18. Malta	84
19. The Netherlands	86
20. Austria	88
21. Poland	90
22. Portugal	92
23. Romania	94

24.	Slovenia	96
25.	Slovakia	98
26.	Finland	100
27.	Sweden	102
28.	The United Kingdom	104

LIST OF TABLES

3.1.	Panel long-run estimates	24
4.1.	Overview of dependent and explanatory variables	26
4.2.	Over- and underinvestment before and after the crisis (difference between observed and predicted investment rate, pp)	27
A1.1.	A selection of empirical studies using targeted infrastructure measures and the production function approach	38
A1.2.	A selection of empirical studies using targeted infrastructure measures and the cost function approach	39
A2.1.	Physical Infrastructure Database	40
A2.2.	Merged database per Member States	41
A3.1.	Panel unit root test results	42
A3.2.	Pedroni and Kao residual cointegration test results	43
A3.3.	Panel FMOLS and DOLS long-run estimates	43
A3.4.	Panel causality test results	44
A4.1.	Estimation results from the panel regression analysis	47

LIST OF GRAPHS

2.1.	Physical infrastructure provision per capita: total road, railway lines and electricity capacity	14
2.2.	Quality of road, rail and electricity infrastructure	16
2.3.	Quality versus perceived quality of road, rail and electricity infrastructure	16
3.1.	Long-term relationship between GDP and infrastructure stock	24
4.1.	Evolution of GFCF rate in the transport and energy sector	25
4.2.	GFCF in different sectors (index 2001=100)	25
4.3.	Road infrastructure investment rate patterns	29
4.4.	Rail infrastructure investment patterns	30
4.5.	Road maintenance spending patterns	30
4.6.	Rail maintenance spending patterns	31
4.7.	Gross fixed capital formation patterns in the energy sector	31

LIST OF BOXES

3.1. Infrastructure and growth

22

1. INTRODUCTION

Investment fell sharply during the crisis and has since remained weak in the EU. By contrast, investment needs in the EU are estimated to be high and concern both private and public investments. This development has been identified in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing, education and healthcare ⁽³⁾. There is a case to increase investment in R&D, innovation and ICT infrastructure as they are important drivers of growth and competitiveness. In particular, the digitalisation of the economy contributes to accelerating productivity growth through several channels including the investment one ⁽⁴⁾.

However, this report shows that there are arguments to also increase investment in more traditional sectors such as energy and transport. First, these networks have always played an important role in the economy, as service and infrastructure providers. Transport networks connect producers and consumers to markets, whereas energy networks provide essential inputs for production and consumption. As such, energy and transport infrastructures form an essential input in an economy's production, which is complementary to other inputs, including labour and capital. ⁽⁵⁾ The economic importance is reflected in the share of total investment directed to these sectors; the share of energy and transport investments in total gross fixed capital formation amounted to about 10% in 2011 ⁽⁶⁾. Second, they play a vital role in the integration and efficiency of the EU's internal market. Investment in cross-border energy infrastructure is also needed to improve the EU's energy security and the functioning of the market. Third, energy and transport are central to the EU's strategic transformation towards a low-carbon economy over the medium-long run. Investment needs in energy and transport infrastructures are therefore expected to remain high in the near future ⁽⁷⁾.

The debate on the need and merits of boosting investments in infrastructure has intensified against the backdrop of the sluggish post-crisis economic performance of EU Member States and the associated need to boost growth. The contribution of infrastructure to growth has become a crucial issue in this time of recession in view of both the fiscal consolidation challenges and the search for new ways to boost growth. The call for infrastructure investments has further strengthened in the light of the current low borrowing costs, which, according to some recent contributions, in the longer run could even render infrastructure investments budget-neutral under certain macro-economic conditions (e.g. identification of investment needs, economic slack, efficiency of investment). ⁽⁸⁾

This report analyses the macro-economic impact of extending infrastructure networks in the EU, focusing on inland transport and electricity infrastructures, and assesses investment patterns in these sectors in a post-crisis context. Section 2 reviews the infrastructure provision and the quality of infrastructure in Member States in these sectors over the past decade. It also describes investment needs in the EU for the coming decade. Section 3 aims to assess whether these infrastructure investments contribute to growth in EU economies. This is a relevant question as infrastructure growth has been high in most Member States and the literature shows that overprovision of infrastructure can divert resources and lead to suboptimal equilibrium. Section 4 analyses investment patterns of these sectors in Member States. Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.

⁽³⁾ DIW (2014)

⁽⁴⁾ Van Ark (2014)

⁽⁵⁾ IMF (2014)

⁽⁶⁾ Based on Eurostat data

⁽⁷⁾ European Commission (2011a and 2001b); European Commission (2014a).

⁽⁸⁾ See e.g. IMF (2014)

2. INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EU: STYLISTED FACTS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Infrastructure in the EU plays an important role in connecting markets. Transport infrastructures provide the means of moving goods and passengers, thus contributing to regional development and the creation of an internal market. Energy infrastructures, by interconnecting markets, not only improve market integration, but also contribute to enhancing security of supply. Over the past decades, infrastructure provision has expanded in Member States.

This chapter describes the evolution of physical infrastructures in inland transport and electricity in Member States.⁽⁹⁾ It also assesses the improvement in the quality of infrastructures in Member States. Finally, it presents the investment needs as identified by the policy agenda in the near future.

2.2. INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION IN MEMBER STATES: 2001-2011

The level of provision of physical infrastructure varies across Member States, with the EU15 having on average a much higher level of provision per capita than the EU12, except for the railway network where it is slightly lower (see Graph 2.1).

On average, the total road network density in 2011, measured in per capita terms, is higher in the new Member States than in the EU15. This is likely to be related to the comparatively sparse population in the EU12 countries. A country's road network density appears to have some relation to its population density and degree and geographical pattern of urbanisation. Furthermore, since 2001, the road network has expanded in the new Member States, in part because of EU funding in the context of cohesion policy, whereas in the EU15 it has slightly decreased during the same period.

Nevertheless, the sparsest networks are found in Croatia and Romania, two new Member States where investment in road has not yet resulted in a network of the same degree of development as in the other new Member States. The network density is relatively low for a number of densely populated old Member States including Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. By contrast, the motorway network density is more developed in the EU15 than in the new Member States, although the heterogeneity within each group is more pronounced than the heterogeneity between them (see also Section 2.3). Similar as for the total road network, a country's motorways network density appears to be related to population and urbanisation. In the case of motorways there also is a relation with the centrality of its geographical location, which is a determinant factor of the relative importance of transit traffic flows.⁽¹⁰⁾

Compared to road, the railway network density is rooted into somewhat different factors, reflecting the influence of economic development, geographical characteristics and historical heritage⁽¹¹⁾. In railways, the contrast between the EU15 and EU10⁽¹²⁾ is less striking than for road, since the new Member States have inherited from the communist period a sizeable railway network. The railway network in most of these countries still seems over-dimensioned in view of the disappointing growth in rail traffic, hence the need for (further) rationalisations. In comparison, in countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal and Belgium the overall railway length per capita is relatively low.


⁽⁹⁾ Due to data limitations, the analysis of this report focuses on electricity, rail and road infrastructures. Data are not available for gas capacity and very often are not included in the empirical literature. As regards telecommunication infrastructures, only data on the number of telephone lines are available for a long period. These data have not been included in the analysis as they do not capture the technological developments in this sector.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Eurostat (2010), chapter 10.

⁽¹¹⁾ Eurostat (2010), footnote 7.

⁽¹²⁾ During the communist era, transport policies were part of the planned economy which favoured non-private modes of transport and the corresponding infrastructures. For instance, the preference for an extensive railway network was in line with the well-known predilection for heavy and bulk manufacturing (Pucher and Buehler, 2005).

Graph 2.1: Physical infrastructure provision per capita: total road, railway lines and electricity capacity



* Except IT (1999); ** Except BE, ES, NL (2010); DK, IE, SE (2009); MT (2008)
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

As regards the electricity generation capacity (¹³) the variation across EU countries seems less pronounced than for the stock of motorways and railways. Compared to the EU average, generation capacity is relatively low in Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Poland, whereas it is very high in Sweden, Luxemburg and Finland. Overall, the EU15 countries tend to have higher capacity than the EU12 countries. However, there are notable exceptions: Estonia has an above EU average capacity and the Netherlands one below average. Other explanatory factors to the observed capacity differences include the composition of the energy mix as some technologies have a higher capacity factor than others, and the interconnections with other countries (¹⁴).

2.3. EVOLUTION OF THE QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN MEMBER STATES: 2001-2011

The quality of infrastructure is an important dimension of infrastructure provision in a country, as it improves the efficiency and effectiveness of network services. Infrastructure quality means, among other things, the possibility for business to get their goods and services in a secure and timely manner in the case of transport, and the absence of interruption and shortages in the case of energy. However, it is difficult to measure as it is intrinsically linked to the services it provides (¹⁵). Empirical work on developing countries use indicators such as the share of paved roads in total road and the percentage of transmission and distribution losses in the production of electricity (¹⁶). With these indicators, the authors want to capture the reliability of the network system to provide services. Similarly, in

(¹³) As regards the energy sector, the analysis focuses on electricity generation capacity (measured in Megawatt per million people) since data on the length of transmission and distribution network are lacking on a long period. Generating capacity of a power station is the maximum electrical net active power it can produce continuously throughout a long period of operation in normal conditions.

(¹⁴) Ideally, generation capacity of a Member State should be judged at the hand of the transmission system operator's capacity to deal with peak demand and their import capacity. See European Commission (2013) and European Commission (2014c) which provide indicators on the capacity of the TSO to deal with peak demand and their import capacity.

(¹⁵) OECD (2011).

(¹⁶) Calderon (2004; 2009).

the EU, the share of motorways can reflect not only the capacity of the network, but its quality in terms of safety and rapidity. In rail, the percentage of electrified line reflects the modernisation of the network. Finally, in electricity, the quality of the system can be measured by its reliability in terms of the duration of electricity disruptions.

Overall, the quality of the road, rail and electricity networks has improved over the past decade (Graph 2.2). The share of motorways in total road network has increased in the majority of the Member States. The same holds for the quality of the railroad, measured in terms of the share of electrified lines in total railway lines. In 2011, the overall share of electrified lines at the EU level exceeds 50%. Finally, the reliability of the electricity network, as measured by the SAIDI index ⁽¹⁷⁾, has improved since 2001 in most of the countries for which data was available.

The World Economic Forum highlights the importance of infrastructures as a key driver of competitiveness. Infrastructure is one of the twelve pillars of competitiveness defined as *"the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country"* ⁽¹⁸⁾. The presence of good infrastructure influences the location of economic activities and their development. For this reason, the World Economic Forum includes scorings on the quality of various infrastructures which are based users' perceptions ⁽¹⁹⁾. As seen in graph 2.3, the perception of the quality of infrastructures is positively correlated to the share of motorways, modernisation of railways and the reliability of the electricity system ⁽²⁰⁾.

Finally, poor quality of the road, rail or electricity network can contribute to lowering the network performances in terms of

reliability, safety and punctuality, hence the importance of maintenance spending.

Maintenance spending includes different types of quality enhancement such as local repair, winter maintenance, renewal, addition of new functionalities (bridge, tunnel, etc...) as well as prolongation of the lifetime of existing infrastructures. The needs vary across networks and Member States according to various economic and sector-specific factors (see section 4).


⁽¹⁷⁾ System Average Interruption Duration Index (see CEER, 2014)

⁽¹⁸⁾ WEF (2013).

⁽¹⁹⁾ WEF (2013). As regards general infrastructures, the question is the following: "How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g. transport, telephony and energy) in your country?"


⁽²⁰⁾ The correlation is weaker for electrified rail lines. Arguably the quality of the railway network could be measured by other indicators such as punctuality and frequency, which are more important from a user point-of-view. Note that electrified rail lines not only account for the modernisation of the network, but also contribute to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions.

Graph 2.2: Quality of road, rail and electricity infrastructure



*Measured by the SAIDI index (CEER, 2014)
(i) Except IT (1999); (ii) Except BE, ES, NL (2010); DK, IE, SE (2009); (iii) Except IT (2000); (iv) Except DE, FR, UK (2010); BE (2009); DK, EL (2008) (v) Except EL, IE, LV, ES (2011)
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and CEER

Graph 2.3: Quality versus perceived quality of road, rail and electricity infrastructure



*Measured by the SAIDI index (CEER, 2014)
(i) Except BE, ES, NL (2010); DK, IE, SE (2009); (ii) Except DE, FR, UK (2010); BE (2009); DK, EL (2008); (iii) Except EL, IE, LV, ES (2011)
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat, WEF and CEER

2.4. INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS: 2011-2030

Infrastructure needs are high. OECD projections ⁽²¹⁾ estimate that worldwide infrastructure needs will be high during the coming decades, given the traffic growth forecast. Traffic in aviation (passenger, cargo), maritime transport (freight) and railways (passenger and freight) is expected to grow worldwide, including in Europe ⁽²²⁾.

In Europe, infrastructure plays a crucial role in connecting and integrating markets, but also in ensuring the transition to a low carbon economy. For this reason, taking account of the policy agenda, Commission services estimate that infrastructure needs will remain high in the medium term for several reasons.

First, energy and transport infrastructures are necessary for the completion of the internal market. Cross-border infrastructures, by increasing trade flows and competition, can have positive effects on growth. In transport, the completion of the TEN-T network requires about €550 bn until 2020. The total costs until 2030 are estimated by Commission services at €1.5 trillion ⁽²³⁾. In energy, the Commission estimates that €200 bn are required up to 2020 to develop cross border interconnections ⁽²⁴⁾. The completion of a fully integrated internal market also contributes to securing energy supply in Europe.

Second, the transition to the low carbon economy has been put as a priority for the EU. Since 2008, the EU has set an ambitious policy agenda with three targets: a 20% reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy as part of the energy consumption and 20% energy efficiency improvements. It is estimated that investments amounting to €205 bn per year are needed up to 2020 to replace ageing infrastructure and achieve

the 2020 climate and energy targets ⁽²⁵⁾. In October 2014, the European Council reached an agreement on new energy and climate targets to be reached by 2030. In this context, investment needs are projected to be high, in particular to make these policies cost effective. The Commission proposal estimate the investment needs to €209 bn per year for the period 2021-2030 ⁽²⁶⁾. These figures include investment in the power, building (residential and tertiary) and industrial sectors, and covers both the needs for replacement of existing installations as well as additional needs due to the raised policy ambition.

⁽²¹⁾ OECD (2012)

⁽²²⁾ Airline traffic worldwide could grow by 4.7% per year over 2010-2030; air freight by 5.9% per year during the same period, maritime container by more than 6% per year, rail passenger and freight traffic by 2-3% per year. These projections have to be manipulated with caution. OCDE. Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030. 2011.

⁽²³⁾ White Paper on Transport (2011).

⁽²⁴⁾ European Commission (2014b)

⁽²⁵⁾ Based on PRIMES, European Commission (2014a). It assumes full achievement of 2020 binding targets..

⁽²⁶⁾ COM/EIB non paper on options for scaling up finance in the context of the 2030 energy and climate framework.

3. ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE AND GROWTH IN THE EU: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Economic theory identifies four channels through which infrastructure can have a positive impact on economic growth. First, energy and transport are used as inputs in firms' production function and hence influences their production cost, directly or indirectly, and ultimately their competitiveness from an international and national perspective (Pradhan and Bagchi, 2013). Second, investment in infrastructure may boost capital accumulation by providing opportunities for capital developments (Kirkpatrick, 2004). Third, it can stimulate aggregate demand by increasing expenditure in construction and maintenance operations (Wang, 2002; Esfahani & Ramirez, 2003; Phang, 2003; Short & Kopp, 2005; Pradhan, Bagchi, 2013). Finally, it may induce other investments by providing signals to key sectors in the economy (Fedderke and Garlick, 2008).

A large number of empirical papers have tried to assess the impact of infrastructure on economic growth. The findings vary considerably, in terms of both the sign and magnitude of the impact. Many studies find a positive and important contribution of infrastructure provision to economic growth, but quite a few studies have found a weak or negligible impact. Some studies even report some statistically significant negative effects.

This chapter reviews the existing literature and investigates the relationship between physical infrastructures (electricity and inland transport) and growth, using an econometric approach.

3.2. EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE

3.2.1. Estimation methods

The applied economics literature on the empirical relation between infrastructure and economic growth traditionally identifies as its starting point the seminal papers by Aschauer (1989a, 1989b). Aschauer found a strong empirical positive relation between public capital and GDP growth in

developed economies. More specifically, he found that a 1% rise in the public capital stock would raise total factor productivity by 0,39%. His empirical analysis provoked intense interest because of its high policy relevance, and the economic and econometric issues involved. As regard the method, many authors⁽²⁷⁾ have noted serious shortcomings in Aschauer's approach both from an economic and econometric perspective. The major issues which have played a role in the subsequent literature concern the difficulty to disentangle the different effects of infrastructure on growth, the possible "reverse causation" effects (from GDP to infrastructure), the possible misspecifications of the model and the statistical problems with infrastructure data availability.

This wide array of challenges has triggered a large follow-up in the literature, displaying a wide variation in geographic scope and estimation specifications and methods. Over time, two tendencies can be observed: first, the attempts to overcome the data availability problems through compiling longer time series and adding a geographic cross-section dimension; second, the application of more sophisticated estimation methods. As regards the underlying economic model, the literature can be divided into two key approaches. The first one is, the "production function" approach, i.e. enhancing the standard macro production function with (public) infrastructure as (free) production factor. The second is the "cost function" approach⁽²⁸⁾ which measures the productivity effects of public infrastructure in terms of cost savings.

3.2.2. Data challenges: monetary or physical values?

The challenges encountered in the empirical work using public capital as a proxy for (public) infrastructure have prompted some authors to use more targeted measures for infrastructure, monetary values and physical ones. A systematic discussion of the pros and cons of using public capital or more focussed measures appears absent from the literature. Shanks and Barnes (2008) does

⁽²⁷⁾ Shanks and Barnes (2008, p.7 and pp 15-25); Calderon and Servén (2002, pp5-7).

⁽²⁸⁾ Shanks and Barnes (2008; pp. 29-30, A14-15).

not devote more than a paragraph in a box to physical measures and admit that data limitations often prompt authors to use a stock variable in value terms rather than the theoretically preferred "flow of capital services".

González Alegre *et al.* (2008) indicate how crude the measures of public capital and investments are. They find that traditional infrastructure accounts on average for about 33% of overall government investment while for some specific countries this share runs up to about 40% ⁽²⁹⁾. For a part, this huge difference in value comes from the investments in public housing and hospitals. Moreover, aspects of both valuation and aggregation reduce the adequacy of the resulting measure for growth and productivity estimations. Government investments aggregate many types of infrastructure on the basis of construction costs rather than use value, hence implicitly assuming away composition effects (and also differences in prices and efficiency across countries) ⁽³⁰⁾. Consequently, all types of public capital are effectively assumed to be homogeneous as regards their productivity impact.

Égert *et al.* (2009) argue that the process of liberalisation and privatisation have rendered government expenditures / investments a less reliable proxy for (public) infrastructure expansion as most of the physical capital and investments are no longer classified as government expenditures. Arguably, this argument is quite relevant for EU countries as the EU has undertaken a process of market opening of network industries since the 1990s. In railways, electricity and communications, network investments are undertaken by private and state-owned enterprises. In some cases (railway in particular), the company can receive "investment grants" that would not be recorded as public gross fixed capital formation ⁽³¹⁾. Moreover, in road, some countries have used concessions to develop infrastructures, which might not be accounted in public gross

capital formation. Ignoring them is a straightforward underestimation of infrastructure development. The unbundling of network operators and services makes financial data on infrastructure investment more difficult to identify. Moreover, market opening in this area underlines the issue of providing incentives to invest rather than spending public money ⁽³²⁾.

Finally, the empirical literature on infrastructure rarely focuses on EU countries. Little empirical work has been done for the new EU Member States (Rutkowski, 2009). Probably for this reason, the literature does not account for the role of EU funds in financing infrastructure. Here again, data on national public spending would underestimate the real amount of financing devoted to infrastructure, or at least leave out the part financed by the EU ⁽³³⁾.

Given data limitations in terms of availability and accounting, there are some grounds to use physical data rather than financial ones. A large part of the empirical literature has used physical data when investigating infrastructure and growth, while acknowledging its limitations in terms of information on costs and quality.

3.2.3. Overview of empirical studies

Tables A1.1 and A1.2 in Appendix 1 present an overview of empirical studies. They are largely based on Shanks and Barnes (2008) and Égert *et al.* (2009).

A few general observations can be made. First, the sample shows that more targeted measures for infrastructure have been used after the Auschauer (1989a, 1989b) studies, in particular after the year 2000. Second, the number of studies using data for

⁽²⁹⁾ Namely, the EU15 "cohesion countries" (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) which over the period of observation, 2000 -2005, have a higher share than the group of EU12 countries.

⁽³⁰⁾ Canning and Pedroni (1999).

⁽³¹⁾ However, as mentioned by González Alegre *and al* (2008), public ownership does not imply that investment is a government one. According to the national account rules, the principal source of revenues determines the recording of investment in corporate or government investment.

⁽³²⁾ Such an issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. For example, Égert (2009) has carried out an empirical investigation on the role of incentive regulation and regulatory independence in boosting investment in network industries of OECD economies. He finds that incentive regulation associated with an independent sector regulator has a strong positive impact on investment in network industries.

⁽³³⁾ The minimum national contribution to interventions supported by Cohesion Policy funds (Cohesion Fund, ERDF) varies, in the current programming period (2007-2013), between 15% and 50% of total eligible expenditure, depending on the relative wealth of the country and/or region concerned. The poorer the region and the Member State, the lower the national co-financing requirement.

European countries appears relatively modest. No study has been found which takes the EU as a scope of study. Third, just like the wider empirical literature which has used public capital as infrastructure proxy, there is a natural tendency over time to use longer time series, more cross-sectional aspects (regions and countries) and more sophisticated estimation models. Fourth, one can tentatively conclude that the cost function approach has not quite established itself as an alternative for the production function approach. This is probably due to the higher data requirements and because it does not directly generate an estimate of the growth effect. Fifth, as regards studies on specific types of infrastructure, the sample strongly suggests that more studies have been carried out for road and telecom infrastructures, and much less so for electricity and rail. Finally, the notion that a co-integration (long-term) relation is crucial for establishing the correct magnitude of the growth effect of infrastructure is present in the literature since the 2000s.

More importantly, the literature has not produced a clear convergence in views on the quantitative size of the growth impact of infrastructure and has not observed any common effects of infrastructure on growth. The results largely depend on the country, the existing capital stock, the time frame and type of infrastructure considered. Some recent empirical works find a positive relationship between infrastructure and growth in OECD countries. Kamps (2005) analyses the impact of public capital on real GDP in 22 OECD countries. In most cases, he finds a positive relationship with a long-run elasticity between 0.41 and 0.84 (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain). Jong-A-Pin and de Haan (2008) find a positive relationship between public capital and output in Sweden, Finland, France and Greece, but a negative one in Ireland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain. Canning and Pedroni (2004) and Égert et al. (2009) find a positive relationship in some countries, but the results vary across infrastructure types. Other previous empirical studies also find a positive long term relationship between infrastructure and growth in Australia and the US (Otto and Voss, 1992, 1994; Garcial-Mila and McGuire, 1992; Madden and Savage, 1998). Similarly, Broyer and Gareis (2013) concluded based on a VAR specification concerning France, Italy, Germany and Spain that an increase in public infrastructure

investment is associated with an increase in output, private investment and employment. Their estimates for the output elasticity of public infrastructure investment ranged between 0.09 for Spain to 0.22 for Italy, with a weighted average equal to 0.17. More recently IMF in the world economic outlook (2014) included a study on the infrastructure investment and supported that there is a positive relationship between infrastructure investments and output, both in the short and long-run. The authors claim that the magnitude of this impact increases during periods of low growth and high investment efficiency. Bom and Ligthart (2011) carry out a metaregression analysis based on 578 estimates from 68 studies which cover the period 1983-2008. They find a range of estimates from -1.726 to 2.040. The authors suggest that most of the variation found in elasticities are explained by study design characteristics such as the definition of public capital and output, restrictions on return to scale, the impact of business cycle, the stationarity of variables and endogeneity concerns. Controlling for all these factors, they estimate a long run estimate of public capital elasticity of 0.17/0.14.

Finally, the literature provides different views on the direction of the relationship between infrastructure and growth. Some authors⁽³⁴⁾ discuss the estimation challenges and acknowledge that a strong statistical association does not provide any information on the direction of the causality. Moreover, in some infrastructures, the causal relationship might be bi-directional. Fedderke and Garlick (2008) review the evidence from the empirical literature in developing countries and point to different relationship depending on the type of infrastructures. In general, road are found to drive growth. The same is observed for public investments as a whole. By contrast, GDP is found to drive ports' freight handling levels and airports' passenger levels. Finally, the findings are less straightforward for electricity and rail. Most of the authors find a bi-directional causality in electricity.

⁽³⁴⁾ Fedderke and Garlick (2008), Calderon and Servén (2004).

Box 3.1: Infrastructure and growth

A large number of empirical studies have been carried out to assess the relationship between the capital infrastructure and the economic growth. The majority of them follow Aschauer's famous work (1989a) and base their estimates on the production function approach. In particular, the study of Canning and Pedroni (2004) uses a supply side model to analyse the impact of infrastructure on growth with physical measures of infrastructure.

Canning and Pedroni derive from their growth model a "bi-variate" cointegration relation between (the log of) output (GDP/capita) and (the log of the) stock of infrastructure. They start with a growth model derived from Barro (1990) and present a Cobb-Douglas production function, as follows:

$$Y_{it} = A_{it} F[K_{it} G_{it} L_{it}] \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{it} is the aggregate output, G_{it} is the infrastructure capital, K_{it} is the other capital, L_{it} is the labour and A_{it} is the total factor productivity. Furthermore, for simplicity reasons, they assume that an increase in infrastructure investment reduces the investments in other types of capital, as infrastructure investment is financed out of savings (s), implying that:

$$G_{t+1} = r_t s Y_t \quad (2)$$

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - r_t) s Y_t \quad (3)$$

To complete their growth model, the authors assume that the technical progress, the share of investment going to infrastructure as well as the size of the workforce is determined by an exogenous stochastic process. The presence or not of a unit root in per capita income will be generated following different assumptions on the random term (stationarity) of total factor productivity and the income share of parameters of the production function. Taking into account these assumptions and equation (2), they derive the specification of their growth model and the relationship between infrastructure and income per capita, which is given form the following dynamic specification (ECM) ⁽¹⁾:

$$g_{t+1} - \bar{r} - s - y_{t+1} = \Delta y_{t+1} + \mu - \bar{n} - n_{t+1} \quad (4)$$

They justify the absence of other key variables in the co-integration relation (notably private capital and human capital) with the argument that "many economic variables tend to move together in a long-run relationship with per capita income," and hence (although this is not explicitly argued) the output variable adequately represents the movement of all the other factors not present in the long-term relation. They also mention that a positive shock of infrastructure will increase income per capita only when the proportion (r) of savings spent on infrastructure investments is below the optimal level and vice versa. Egert et al (2009) point to the strong assumptions of the authors, i.e. the instantaneous depreciation of infrastructure, which lead them to overcome the problem of omitted variables and help them to reduce the problem to two variables.

The advantages of their approach are simplicity and parsimony, which matters in view of the limited number of observations. Moreover, the estimates of the error-correction equation inform on the direction of the causality and whether the amount of infrastructure is below or above the optimal (i.e. long-run) level. The authors find that shocks in infrastructure indeed affect economic growth in the subsequent periods, in particular when the stock of infrastructure is relatively low vis-à-vis the level of output. For roads and telecom infrastructure, the level of infrastructure is found to be on average close to optimal, while electricity production capacity is on average under -provided, which may explain why so many studies have found strong significant growth impacts from electricity infrastructure.

⁽¹⁾ The variables are in logs.

3.3. MODEL

Following the work carried out by Canning and Pedroni (1999 and 2004), the relationship between GDP per capita and infrastructure provision per capita, for electricity sector and inland sector (road and rail), over the period 1950-2012 is investigated. The objective is to see whether there is a long term relationship between both variables (see Box 3.1) and how they relate to each other. For this purpose, a panel analysis is employed, consisting of three main steps.

First, in order to determine the appropriate empirical approach, the time series properties of the data are analysed and the series are tested for stationarity. Second, after determining the order of integration in the series, heterogeneous panel cointegration tests are used to investigate whether a long term relationship between the variables exists. Where this was applicable, the cointegrated relationship between both series is then analysed in order to estimate the long-run relationship between infrastructure and GDP based on the Full Modified OLS and Dynamic OLS estimations of the following specification:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 g_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where i is the country (for $i = 1, \dots, 28$), t is time (for $t = 1950, \dots, 2012$), g_{it} is the measure of physical infrastructure per unit in country i at time t , y_{it} is GDP per million people in PPS, α and β are the coefficients for the individual effects and the independent variable, respectively and ε is the error.

Finally, as a third step where there was a co-integrating relationship, a panel error correction model was chosen, including the lagged error of equation (1), so as to be able to assess in which way the causality is running and to distinguish between long-run and short-run effects. Appendix 4 provides more details on the model.

3.4. DATA

The model uses a physical infrastructure approach – kilometres of roads and railway lines (transport) and megawatt of electrical capacity (electricity). As regard transport, the model uses a composite

indicator reflecting the combined network length of road and rail infrastructure.⁽³⁵⁾

Data availability as well as the review of the empirical literature played a role in choosing physical data⁽³⁶⁾.

The difficulty was to find long time series with cross-country comparable data. Eurostat provides data from 1990 until 2008. In general, the literature uses the database of Canning (1998) with a time span of 1950 to 1998 a starting point. It has later been updated and merged with the World Bank database (Canning, 1998; Canning and Farahani, 2007). In this paper, the merged database of Canning and the World Bank is used. It is updated with Eurostat data when possible (see Appendix 2 for more details). GDP per capita in PPS is retrieved from the AMECO database of the European Commission.

In order to express all the variables with the same magnitude, values are expressed in per capita terms (divided per million people). The population series comes from Eurostat. A logarithmic transformation is applied to every series.

3.5. RESULTS

The findings from the econometric analysis⁽³⁷⁾ indicate that in the long term both transport and electricity infrastructures are positively correlated with GDP (see Table 3.1 and Graph 3.1). Investments in electricity capacity and transport infrastructure have a long-term horizon, and are thus expected to provide long term supply effects. These results are consistent with the findings provided by the empirical literature where

⁽³⁵⁾ The indicator is calculated as a weighted sum of the total length of the road and rail network. The weights are proportional to the road and rail traffic per network kilometre, with traffic calculated as the geometric mean of the passenger and freight tonne kilometres. The calculation results in a weight of 1 for one kilometre of road and a weight of 2.614 for one kilometre of rail.

⁽³⁶⁾ See section 3.2.2 for more information.

⁽³⁷⁾ See Appendix 3 for detailed results and Bom and Lightart (2011) for a recent review of empirical estimates. The relationship can be negative for some countries with high stock of infrastructure.

most of the empirical studies find a positive relationship⁽³⁸⁾.

As regards the magnitude of the relationship, the size of the long-run elasticity for both sectors is in line with the existing literature. As mentioned in section 3.2 and appendix 3, estimate range widely from 0.06 to 0.84. Most of these differences can be explained by the econometric specifications, the sample coverage and time span, but also by other dimensions such as the type of infrastructure and the definition of output (see Bom and Lightart (2011) in section 3.2)

Results reveal that the time trend is positive and significant. This may be regarded as long-run technological innovations effects on growth (Canning and Pedroni, 2008). The positive sign of the trend over the output might reflect the efficiency gains over the period.

Table 3.1: Panel long-run estimates

Variable	Dependent Variable: GDP	
	$GDP_t = \alpha + \gamma^*t + b^*EI_t + \varepsilon_t$	$GDP_t = \alpha + \gamma^*t + b^*ROR_t + \varepsilon_t$
FMOLS b-Coeff.	0.250***	0.189***
Constant (a)	21.180***	20.585***
Trend (t)	0.019***	0.025***

Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.


FMOL: Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares

Source: Commission Services

As regards the causality, electricity and transport infrastructures drive GDP growth in the long-run. In the case of electricity capacity, the long-term causality with GDP is bidirectional, i.e. GDP has a positive effect on electricity capacity, in line with Canning and Pedroni's findings (2008) and other studies (Fedderke and Garlick, (2008). This could be related to the fact that economic growth leads to higher electricity consumption and hence higher generation capacity is needed to meet the increased demand. By contrast, the unidirectional causality running from inland transport infrastructure to GDP, implies that higher economic growth demands higher levels of infrastructure investments, given that these investments have not exceed the growth-

maximizing level. The literature is inconclusive on the direction of the causality and, thus this finding would require further investigation.

Graph 3.1: Long-term relationship between GDP and infrastructure stock



Source: Commission Services

Short-run shocks in electricity and transport infrastructure appear to have less substantial impact on the current GDP level. This suggests that positive effects from investments in transport or electricity infrastructure require time to materialise. However, the findings indicate that the infrastructure provisions and GDP always converge to their positive long term relationship and that any shocks do not have a permanent impact.

⁽³⁸⁾ It should be noticed the range of estimates on the sign of this relationship is wide. This is explained by different factors such as the type of variables chosen, the time span investigated and the methodologies used, Canning and Pedroni (2004), Kamps (2005), Jong-A-Pin and de Haan (2008) and Egert et al. (2009), Otto and Voss (1992, 1994), Garcial-Mila and McGuire (1992) and Madden and Savage (1996) for Australia and US.

4. ASSESSING RECENT INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE EU

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, investment in infrastructure has been hit by the crisis. While some countries may have heavily invested in infrastructure during the pre-crisis period, the same countries have been particularly hit by the crisis. Lack of investment hampers growth, but over-investment also negatively impact growth. Thus, it is important to analyse the recent investment patterns in Member States.

This chapter analyses the investment patterns of Member States in a pre and post crisis context and provide an attempt to understand the investment evolution in the light of macro-economic trends.


4.2. INVESTMENT AND MAINTENANCE SPENDING DURING THE CRISIS IN THE EU

Compared to other sectors, investments in energy and transport have slightly decreased after the crisis The infrastructure investment rate (i.e. the ratio of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to GDP) in the combined transport and energy sector⁽³⁹⁾ increased from 2.2 to 2.7% in the pre-crisis period 2001-2008 (Graph 4.1). During 2008-2012 the rate decreased by 0.1pp; a 0.2pp increase in the energy sector rate was offset by a 0.3pp decrease in the transport sector rate. GFCF in the combined transport and energy sector decreased less sharply than that in other sectors in the economy during the post-crisis period (Graph 4.2).

The data at EU level masks disparities across different Member States. In some Member States, the investment was low during the pre-crisis period and did not increase after the crisis. By contrast, in other Member States, the investment rate was quite sustained before the


crisis in conjunction with an increase in construction investment⁽⁴⁰⁾.

Graph 4.1: Evolution of GFCF rate in the transport and energy sector



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Graph 4.2: GFCF in different sectors (index 2001=100)



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

4.3. ASSESSING INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE EU: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Assessing investment patterns helps understand the recent evolutions of Member States before and after the crisis. For this reason, it is useful to identify the presence of over- or underinvestments in Member States, i.e. the expected investment rate taking into account demand and structural factors.

⁽³⁹⁾ The transport and energy sectors cover the sections D and H of the NACE rev 2 nomenclature, respectively. Furthermore, they include the parts of Section F (construction) which cover transport and energy infrastructure, respectively. The share of the parts of Section F covering transport and energy infrastructure are estimated at 15.8% and 0.9%, respectively, based on Eurostat structural business statistics data for the period 2008-2012.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ DIW (2014).

Table 4.1: Overview of dependent and explanatory variables

Dependent variable	Explanatory variables
1.Road infrastructure investment rate	- Road use
2.Road infrastructure maintenance spending rate	- Cohesion dummy variable
	- Road network density
	- Industrialization rate
	- Employment rate
3.Rail infrastructure investment rate	- Rail use
4.Rail infrastructure maintenance spending rate	- Cohesion dummy variable
	- Rail network density
	- Industrialization rate
	- Employment rate
5.GFCF rate in the energy sector	- Electricity consumption
	- Cohesion dummy variable
	- Industrialization rate
	- Employment rate

Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD (road and rail infrastructure investment and maintenance spending rate) and Eurostat (all other data)

In this analysis under- or overinvestment is defined as the difference between the observed investment rates and the investment rates predicted by an econometric model accounting for specific macro-economic and sector-specific factors which impact on the investment rate in these sectors. Given the shorter period under scrutiny, monetary data are used as opposed to physical data in the previous chapter.

The analysis zooms in on investment in the road, rail and energy sectors. It also analyses maintenance spending on road and rail infrastructure. Maintenance is closely linked to the length of the network, but also to the traffic intensity as it influences wear and tear of roads. Under-spending in maintenance can lead to a deterioration of the quality of the network, hence lowering the efficiency of the whole network (see section 2.2).

The methodology consists of a number of steps⁽⁴¹⁾. First, based on annual panel data from 1996 to 2012, an econometric model is estimated. It specifies the investment or maintenance spending rate as a function of a number of macro-economic and sector-specific indicators (see Appendix 4 for details). Second, the estimated coefficients are used to calculate the model-predicted investment rate for each Member State and each year. The predicted investment rate can

be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium or structural investment rate, commensurate to a Member State's macro-economic and sector-specific fundamentals. As a final step the predicted value is compared with the observed investment rate in order to identify over- or underinvestment.

A number of caveats to the methodology used should be noted. First, the terms over- and underinvestment should not be interpreted as representing the difference between the actual investments and the investment *needs*. While infrastructure investment needs correspond to a specific objective set by policy makers (e.g. connectivity, network coverage, policy target), over- or underinvestment refer to deviations of the observed investment rate from the model-predicted investment rate based on the internal macro-economic and sector-specific factors of a region or country. Second, the analysis rests on the assumption that the statistical relationship between the macro-economic and sector-specific indicators and the investment (maintenance) rate is common to all Member States. Third, due to data constraint, the investment rates do not dissociate private and public investment. Fourth, the focus on monetary measures of investment does not capture possible differences in efficiency of investment between countries and over time.

4.4. DATA AND SPECIFICATION

The econometric model is estimated based on panel data using country fixed effects (see

⁽⁴¹⁾ The methodology is based on a similar approach used by DIW (2014) to assess over- and underinvestment in overall gross fixed capital formation in OECD countries.

Table 4.2: Over- and underinvestment before and after the crisis (difference between observed and predicted investment rate, pp)

Subsector	Member State group	Pre-crisis average (1995-2007)	Trough*	Post-crisis average (2008-2012)
Road infrastructure investment rate	Core EA	0.005%	-0.071%	-0.021%
	Rest of EA	0.014%	-0.092%	-0.050%
	New Member States	-0.102%	0.186%	0.351%
	Rest of non-EA	-0.009%	-0.001%	0.043%
Rail infrastructure investment rate	Core EA	0.01%	-0.05%	-0.04%
	Rest of EA	-0.022%	0.009%	0.067%
	New Member States	-0.01%	0.00%	0.03%
	Rest of non-EA	0.023%	-0.083%	-0.070%
Road infrastructure maintenance spending rate	Core EA	-0.01%	-0.01%	0.01%
	Rest of EA	-0.046%	-0.059%	-0.072%
	New Member States	-0.02%	0.06%	0.11%
	Rest of non-EA	0.015%	-0.087%	-0.043%
Rail infrastructure maintenance spending rate	Core EA	-0.01%	-0.01%	0.04%
	Rest of EA	-0.026%	-0.059%	-0.055%
	New Member States	0.01%	-0.01%	-0.03%
	Rest of non-EA	-0.013%	0.033%	0.042%
GFCF in energy	Core EA	-0.01%	0.01%	0.03%
	Rest of EA	-0.054%	-0.031%	0.190%
	New Member States	0.03%	-0.14%	0.04%
	Rest of non-EA	-0.103%	0.155%	0.271%

*"Trough" corresponds to the year in the 2008-2012 period in which the observed investment rate was the lowest.

Source: Commission Services

Appendix 4 for technical details). The estimations are done with five different dependent variables, corresponding to the different subsectors under analysis, i.e., (i) road infrastructure investment rate, (ii) road infrastructure maintenance spending rate, (iii) rail infrastructure investment rate, (iv) rail infrastructure maintenance spending rate⁽⁴²⁾, and (v) gross fixed capital formation rate in the energy sector⁽⁴³⁾. The set of explanatory variables differs between subsectors, taking account of macro-economic characteristics, sector-specific variables and possible EU funding.

Transport-specific variables account for the existing stock of infrastructure and the use of it. High provision of infrastructure is expected to induce less investment in new infrastructure, but higher maintenance costs. The provision of infrastructure is given by the network density. The road network density variable is equal to the length

of the road network in kilometres divided by the population. The rail variable is analogously computed based on the length of rail tracks. By contrast, higher use of infrastructure measured by the road and rail traffic intensity on the respective networks⁽⁴⁴⁾ would justify additional investments as well as higher maintenance spending.

The electricity consumption variable accounts for the use of the electricity infrastructure. Higher electricity consumption would justify a more extensive electricity network and hence higher investment in electricity generation capacity. However, one important shortcoming is that the model does not specifically account for the infrastructure investments required by the penetration of new low carbon technologies. Such limitations might lead to underestimation of the model-predicted investment rate in that sector (see below).

Macro-economic variables take account of the characteristics of the country and its economic structure. The industrialization rate is equal to the share of the industrial sector in total gross value added. A higher share of manufacturing is expected to induce higher investments in

⁽⁴²⁾ Data on road and rail infrastructure investment come from OECD (2013). Investment includes new construction, extensions, reconstruction, renewal and major repair. Maintenance covers other maintenance expenses. Estimates of under- and overinvestment based on GFCF in transport give a more aggregate picture and confirm the results at sector level.

⁽⁴³⁾ The energy sector covers section D of the NACE rev 2 nomenclature plus the parts of Section F (construction) which covers energy infrastructure. The share of the part of Section F covering energy infrastructure is estimated at 0.9%, based on Eurostat structural business statistics data for the period 2008-2012. GFCF in the energy sector includes GFCF in grids (transmission and distribution) as well as generation.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Road use is calculated as road traffic divided by road network length, where road traffic is calculated as the geometric mean of road passenger kilometres and road freight tonne kilometres. The rail use variable is analogously calculated.

infrastructure. The employment rate represents the active share of the total population. The expected relationship with investment depends upon whether labour and infrastructure investments are complements or substitutes in production ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

The level of income plays an important role in infrastructure investment. In the case of the EU, lower income countries benefit from support from EU's structural funds ⁽⁴⁶⁾. The cohesion variable is a dummy variable which has the value one for Member States receiving support. This is considered to be the case during multi-annual framework periods if the ratio of absorbed cohesion policy funding to national GDP exceeded a certain threshold ⁽⁴⁷⁾.

4.5. INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN MEMBER STATE GROUPS: COMPARISON IN THE LIGHT OF MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS

The impact of the crisis as well as infrastructure provision and transport-modal orientation differ across Member States. Member States have been grouped into four different groups ⁽⁴⁸⁾, i.e., (i) Core Euro Area, (ii) Rest of Euro Area, (iii) New Member States, and (iv) Rest of non-EA countries ⁽⁴⁹⁾. The analysis of under- and overinvestment is carried out for each of the Member State groups ⁽⁵⁰⁾ and for each of the

subsectors. Annex I provides results for individual Member States.

The results of the analysis show a complex picture reflecting substantial differences in investment profiles, both between subsectors and across Member State groups (Table 4.2 and Graphs 4.3 - 4.7).

In road infrastructure, there are indications of underinvestment in the Euro Area during the post-crisis period. The two Euro Area groups (i.e. Core EA and Rest of EA) appear to have lower investment patterns compared to what could be predicted in the post-crisis period, following a period of overinvestment before the crisis. This pattern is most pronounced in the Rest of EA Member States and is likely to reflect an adjustment following the construction-focused investment boom in the pre-crisis years. By contrast, the other two Member States groups (New Member States and Rest of non-EA), display investment above the predicted rate during the post crisis period, following underinvestment in the preceding period. This pattern is most pronounced in the New Member States group, where it is linked to the sustained increase in the investment rate throughout the period under consideration. This reflects a catch-up effect in combination with increasing EU funding, which has been provided in the context of the cohesion policy.

As for maintenance spending on road infrastructure, the results indicate a situation of underspending during the post-crisis period in the Rest of EA and the Rest of non-EA group. Interestingly, for each of the country groups, the pattern of the difference between the observed and predicted line appears to be opposite of that for road investment spending. This suggests that overinvesting in new infrastructure is associated with underspending on maintenance, and vice versa.

For rail infrastructure, results point to underinvestment in the Core EA and Rest of non-EA countries during the post-crisis period. In the case of the Core EA group the underinvestment amounts to a larger shortfall than for road infrastructure. Observed investment rates in the New Member States group have generally been below the predicted rate, which can be related to the historical focus on the rail mode. Hence, the

⁽⁴⁵⁾ World Bank (1996).

⁽⁴⁶⁾ However, given the development of infrastructure in Member States, the financial support has shifted towards other areas such as innovation, SMEs and social policies. See European Commission (2014d).

⁽⁴⁷⁾ The threshold is determined as the median value of the ratio of absorbed cohesion policy funding to GDP for the 2007-2013 multi-annual framework period.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ The main criterion has been the distinction between euro area and non-euro area countries. Each group has been further split. In the euro area group, the countries which have been hit hard by the crisis have been grouped together. In non-euro area countries, the new Member States have been isolated from the rest.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ The Core EA group (core Member States of the Euro Area) includes AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, LU and NL. The Rest of EA group (other Member States of the Euro Area) includes CY, EL, ES, IE, IT, PT and SI. The New MS group (New Member States) includes BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, RO and SK. The Rest of non-Euro Area group (Member States that do not belong to any of the other groups) includes DK, SE and UK.


⁽⁵⁰⁾ The observed and predicted investment rates for the four Member State groupings are calculated as weighted averages of the corresponding Member State-specific investment rates

high provision of rail infrastructure in the past has reduced the need for new investments. In the post-crisis period the rate has increased up to a point above the predicted rate which, similarly as for road, could be related to EU funding provided following their accession. However, in this case the surplus is of a much lower magnitude than for rail. In the Rest of EA group, the rail infrastructure investment rate has exceeded the predicted rate since the beginning of the century, resulting on average in overinvestment during the post-crisis period.

As for maintenance spending on rail infrastructure, the results show that there is less underspending during the post-crisis period than during the preceding period. Only for the new Member States do the results indicate a situation of (minor) underspending.

As regards the GFCF rate in energy, the analysis does not indicate underinvestment in the post-crisis period. The GFCF rate in energy has generally increased since the turn of the century in all Member State groups, in part reflecting increasing investments in renewable energy infrastructure. Notably, the investment rate has been largely unaffected by the crisis, resulting in comparatively high investment rates in recent years which have resulted in the current situation of overinvestment. In particular, in the Rest of EA and Rest of non-EA groups there seems to have been relatively high investments in energy in recent years. As mentioned above, the econometric specification does not specifically account for the ongoing energy transformation (aimed at high penetration of renewables) which induces investment needs higher than what can be predicted based on demand factors.


Graph 4.3: Road infrastructure investment rate patterns



*Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.


Source: Commission Services

Graph 4.4: Rail infrastructure investment patterns




*Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.
Source: Commission Services

Graph 4.5: Road maintenance spending patterns




*Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.
Source: Commission Services

Graph 4.6: Rail maintenance spending patterns



*Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.
Source: Commission Services

Graph 4.7: Gross fixed capital formation patterns in the energy sector



*Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.
Source: Commission Services

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over the past decades, infrastructure growth has been sustained in the EU, in particular in road transport, and to a lesser extent in other types of infrastructure – railways and electricity. In general, infrastructure provision is still lower in new Member States (except in railway). Filling the gap between the EU15 and the EU12 is justified for cohesion reasons and has provided the rationale of investing in infrastructure.

Energy and transport infrastructure needs are high on the policy agenda. Interconnections are crucial to complete the internal market, while the transition to the low carbon economy also requires massive investment in the energy and transport sectors. For this reason, investments are expected to remain high in this sector in the coming years.

As for the macroeconomic impact, there is a positive relationship between transport and electricity infrastructures and growth in the long term. Policies promoting spending in transport and electricity infrastructures can lead to positive impacts on growth provided there is no overprovision of infrastructure. In the case of electricity, the results furthermore show that growth, through increased electricity consumption, can translate into additional infrastructure investment, which in turn would benefit economic growth.

Analysis of recent infrastructure investment patterns shows different investment patterns across Member States. In Core Euro Area countries infrastructure investment has been low for both road and rail. In the Rest of EA countries, there seems to be an adjustment following a period of investment boom in the past. In New Member States, a sustained increase in the investment rate corresponds to the need to fill the gap with the rest of the EU. The result is an observed investment that is higher-than predicted in both road and rail transport infrastructure. In the energy sector, the analysis confirms the dynamic developments of investment in this sector, which reflects the recent transformation supported by the EU climate and energy agenda.

Current macro-economic conditions combined with the EU policy agenda provide opportunities to increase investment in infrastructure. However, this should be done in

an appropriate way, taking account of the individual situation of economies in terms of infrastructure stock, transport and electricity demand as well as other parameters such as fiscal space and cost-benefit analysis of projects.

REFERENCES

- Aschauer, D.A. (1989a), "Is public expenditure productive?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* Vol.23, Nr.2, pp. 177–200.
- Aschauer, D.A. (1989b), "Does public capital crowd out private capital?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* Vol 24, pp. 171–88.
- Barro, R. J. (1990), "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 98, pp. 103-125.
- Bom, P.R.D., J. E. Ligthart (2011), "What Have We Learned From Three Decades of Research on the Productivity of Public Capital?", Working Paper, forthcoming *Journal of Economic Surveys*
- Broyer, S., and J. Gareis (2013), "How large is the infrastructure multiplier in the euro area?"
- Natixis FLASH Economics, No. 227, March 22.
- Calderon C (2009), Infrastructure and Growth in Africa, *World Bank*, WPS4914.
- Calderón, C. and L. Servén (2002), "The Output Cost of Latin America's Infrastructure Gap", *Central Bank of Chile*, Working Paper No. 186.
- Calderón C. and L. Servén (2004), The effects of infrastructure development on growth and income distribution, *Central Bank of Chile*, WP n° 270.
- Canning D. (1998), "A Database of World Stocks of Infrastructure: 1950-1995", *The World Bank Economic Review*, vol. 12, pp. 529-548
- Canning, D. and M. Farahani (2007), A Database of World Stocks of Infrastructure: Update 1950-2005, *Harvard School of Public Health*. <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/david-canning/data-sets/>
- Canning, D. and P. Pedroni (2004), "The Effect of Infrastructure on Long Run Economic Growth", mimeo, July 1999.
- Canning, D. and P. Pedroni (2008), "Infrastructure, Long-run Economic Growth and Causality Tests for Cointegrated Panels," *Manchester School*, 76(5), pp. 504-527.
- Canning, D., M. Fay and R. Perotti (1994), 'Infrastructure and Growth' in Baldassarri, M., L. Paganetto and E. Phelps (eds), *International Differences in Growth Rates: Market Globalization and Economic Areas*, *Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy series*, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Canning, D. and E. Bennathan (2000), "The social rate of return on infrastructure investments," *World Bank Working Paper* WPS2390, World Bank, Washington DC, July 2000.
- Caporale, G. M. and N. Pittis (2004): "Estimator choice and Fisher's paradox: A Monte Carlo study", *Econometric Reviews*, vol. 23, pp. 25-52.
- CEER (2014), Benchmarking Report 5.1 on the Continuity of Electricity Supply, Data update, Ref: C13-EQS-57-03
- DIW (2014) Weak investment dampens Europe's growth, *Economic Bulletin* 7 - Economic Impulses in Europe.

Égert, B. T. Kozluk and D. Sutherland (2009), "Infrastructure and growth: Empirical Evidence," *OECD Economics Department Working Papers* No.685, OECD Publishing.

Égert, B. (2009), "Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: the role of incentive regulation and regulatory independence". *CESifo Working Paper* n° 2642.

Enders, W. (1995), "*Applied Econometric Time Series*", John Wiley & Sons.

Esfahani, H. and M.T. Ramíres 2003, Institutions, Infrastructure and Economic Growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 70, pp. 443–477.

European Commission (2009) The EU's response to support the real economy during the economic crisis: an overview of Member States' recovery measures. *European Economy, Occasional Paper* 51. July 2009. Brussels.

European Commission (2011a) White paper on transport. Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system.

European Commission (2011b), A growth package for integrated European infrastructures, COM(2011)276 final.

European Commission (2013), Market Functioning in Network Industries – Electronic Communications, Energy and Transport, *Occasional Paper* N° 129.

European Commission (2014a), Impact Assessment on A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the period from 2020 to 2030.

European Commission (2014b), European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014)330.

European Commission (2014c), Market Functioning in Network Industries – Electronic Communications, Energy and Transport

European Commission (2014d), Sixth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion

Eurostat (2010), *Regional Yearbook 2010* – Chapter 10 – Transport.

Fedderke, J and Garlick, R. 2008. Infrastructure development and economic growth in South Africa: a review of the accumulated evidence. *Policy Paper* No 12. School of Economics, University of Cape Town and Economic Research Southern Africa.

Fernald, J.G. (1999), "Roads to prosperity? Assessing the link between public capital and productivity," *American Economic Review* 89, pp. 619-38.

Garcia-Mila, T. and T. J. McGuire (1992), "The contribution of publicly provided inputs to states economics", *Regional Sciences and Urban Economics*, vol. 22, pp. 229–41.

Garcia-Mila, T., T.J. McGuire, and R. Porter (1996), "The effect of public capital in state-level production functions reconsidered", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. LXXVIII, no. 1, pp. 177–80.

González Alegre, J., A. Kappeler, A. Kolev and T. Vålilä (2008), Composition of government investment in Europe: Some forensic evidence, *EIB paper*, Vol. 13 No. 1/2008

- Hausman JA (1978), Specification tests in econometrics. *Econometrica*, vol. 46, pp. 1251-1271.
- Hendry, D.F. and K. Juselius (2000), "Explaining Cointegration Analysis: Part II", *Energy Journal* 21, 1–42.
- Holtz-Eakin, D. and M. E. Lovely (1996), "Scale economies, returns to variety, and the productivity of public infrastructure," *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 105-123, April.
- IMF (2014) Legacies, clouds, uncertainties. World Economic Outlook (WEO). October 2014. IMF
- Jong-A-Pin, R., and J. de Haan (2008), "Time-varying impact of public capital on output: New evidence based on VARs for OECD countries", *EIB Paper* Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 56-81.
- Kam, T. (2001), "Public Infrastructure Spill-overs and Growth: Theory and Time Series Evidence for Australia", *Department of Economics Working Paper* 00-01, University of Melbourne.
- Kamps, C (2005), "[The Dynamic Effects of Public Capital: VAR Evidence for 22 OECD Countries](#)," *International Tax and Public Finance*, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 533-558, August.
- Kamps, C. (2004), "The Dynamic Effects of Public Capital: VAR Evidence for 22 OECD Countries," *Kiel Working Papers* 1224, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Keeler, T. and J. S. Ying (1988), "Measuring the benefits of a large public investment: The case of the U.S. Federal-aid highway system", *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 36, pp. 69–85.
- Kirkpatrick, C., Parker, D, Zhang, Y. 2004, Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Does Regulation Make A Difference? Centre on Regulation and Competition, WP No. 85, ISBN: 1-904056-84-9 .
- Madden, G. and S. Savage (1998), "Sources of Australian labour productivity change 1950– 1994", *Economic Record*, vol. 78, no. 242, pp. 343–57.
- Monsalve, C. (2011), *Railway reform in South East Europe and Turkey: on the right track?*, World Bank, Transport Unit, Sustainable Development Europe and Central Asia Region.
- Nadiri, M.I. and T.P. Mamuneas (1996), *Contributions of highway capital to Industry and National Productivity Growth*, US Federal Highway Administration, Washington DC.
- Nadiri, M.I. and T.P. Mamuneas (1998), Contributions of highway capital to output and productivity growth in the US economy and industries, US Federal Highway Administration, Washington DC.
- OECD (2011), "*Pension Funds Investment in Infrastructure. A Survey*"
- OECD (2012), "*Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030*".
- OECD (2013), http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ITF_INV-MTN_DATA
- Otto, G. and G. Voss (1994), "Public capital and private sector productivity", *Economic Record*, vol. 70, no. 209, pp. 121–32.
- Otto, G. and G. Voss (1992), Public Capital and Private Sector Productivity: Evidence for Australia 1966/67-89/90, UNSW, *mimeo*.

- Phang, S. 2003. Strategic development of airport and rail infrastructure: the case of Singapore. *Transport Policy*, 10, 27-33.
- Pradhan, R.P., Bagchi, T.P. 2013. Effect of Transportation Infrastructure on Economic Growth in India: The VECM Approach. *Research in Transportation Economics* 38 (2013) 139-148.
- Pucher J. and R. Buehler (2005), *Transport Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*. In Button and Hensher, eds., *Transport Strategy, Policy, and Institutions*, Oxford, England, Elsevier Press.
- Roller, L.-H. and L. Waverman (2001), 'Telecommunications infrastructure and economic development: A simultaneous approach', *American Economic Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 909-23.
- Romp, W. and J. de Haan (2007), "Public capital and economic growth: A critical survey", *Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik*, Vol. 8, pp. 6-52.
- Rutkowski, A. (2009), "Public investment, transport infrastructure and growth in Poland," *ECFIN Country Focus* Vol.6 Issue 11 (17.12.2009).
- Seitz, H. (1993), "A dual economic analysis of the benefits of the public road network", *The Annals of Regional Science*, Vol. 27, pp. 223-39.
- Schwab, K. (2011), *Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012*, World Economic Forum, Geneva.
- Shanks, S. and P. Barnes, (2008), *Econometric Modelling of Infrastructure and Australia's Productivity*, Internal Research Memorandum, Cat No. 08-01, Productivity Commission, Canberra, January 2008.
- Short, J., & Kopp, A. 2005, Transport Infrastructure: investment and planning policy and research aspects. *Transport Policy*, 12, 360-367.
- Stephan, A. (2000), "Regional infrastructure policy and its impact on productivity: a comparison of Germany and France", *Applied Economics Quarterly*, Vol. 46, pp. 327- 356.
- Sturm, J.-E. (2001), "The impact of public infrastructure capital on the private sector of the Netherlands: An application of the symmetric McFadden cost function", in R. Batina, (ed.), *Public Finance and Management Symposium on Public Capital*, Vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 230-60.
- Sutherland, D., S. Araújo, B. Égert and T. Kozluk (2009), "Infrastructure investment: links to growth and the role of public policies, " *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 686, OECD, Paris.
- Van Ark B., (2014), Total Factor productivity: Lessons from the past and directions for the future. Working Paper Research, National Bank of Belgium, October.
- Wang, E. C. 2002, Public infrastructure and economic growth: a new approach applied to East Asian Economies. *Journal of Policy Modelling*, 24, 411-435
- Winston, C.M. (1990). "How efficient is current infrastructure spending and pricing?" Conference Serie; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 183-222.
- World Bank (1996), *Determinants of Public Expenditure on Infrastructure*. Transportation and Communication. Randolph S., Bogetic Z., Hefley D. WP51661.
- World Bank (2011), *World Development Indicators 2011*, World Bank, Washington DC.

APPENDIX 1

Literature Review

Table A1.1: A selection of empirical studies using targeted infrastructure measures and the production function approach

Author	Specification / method	Infra variable / dependent variable	Period	Data	Elasticity / Outcome	Comment
<i>Otto and Voigt (1992, 1994)</i>	Cobb-Douglas	Investment in road infra / private sector TFP	1966-67 to 1991-92;	Australia; time series	Aggr. 0.27	Follows Aschauer's approach
<i>García-Mila & McQuinn (1992)</i>	Cobb-Douglas	Capital expenditure Highways (next to education) / gross state production	1970-1983	Cross-section, time series for 48 US states	Highways: around 0, 045	Cannot reject increasing returns to scale
<i>Canning, Fap & Perotti (1994)</i>	Output growth	Physical infra data for road, rail, electricity and telecom	1940-1985	Panel, 98 countries (cross-section & panel analysis)	Telecom and electricity significant. Road and rail unclear due to statistical problems	Relationship between infra level and output growth
<i>García-Mila et alia (1996)</i>	Cobb-Douglas	Highways (next to water & sewer, and other public capital)	1970-1983	As (1992) study	Negative values, statistically insignificant	Preferred specification of first differences with fixed state effects
<i>Madden and Savage (1998)</i>	Cobb-Douglas, transformed into Error Correction Model (multivariate co-integration relation)	ITT capital (telephones) / labour productivity	1950-1994	Australia; time series	LR: 0.183 ; SR: 0.264 (on labour productivity)	Although no explicit co-integration relation specified, LR elasticities suggest one between labour, capital and telecom infra
<i>Fernald (1999)</i>	Translog	Roads infra	1953-1989	US: man and industries	0.35 to 0.38 for manco outcomes for industry level production spillovers for roads through car use not reported)	Fixed, strong cross-section effects
<i>Canning and Brenowhan (2000)</i>	Variant of translog	Physical infra data for road, electricity / Output	1960-1990	Panel, 42 countries	Roads 0.09; Electricity 0.09	Constant returns to scale imposed. Infra complementary with other types of capital
<i>Stephan (2000)</i>	Cobb-Douglas and translog	Road infra capital stock, regional GDP (in 2000 PPP)	1970-1995 (west DE), 1978-1992 (FR)	11 Länder (west) DE; 22 French regions	Road infra significant using "pooled" elasticities. For DE and FR generates more reliable estimates	Control with time trend and fixed cross-section effects. No account taken of inter-regional spillovers
<i>Kam (2001)</i>	Variation on Barro's stochastic growth model, (see Canning & Pedroni) resulting in multivariate co-integration relation between GDP, infrastructure and private capital and time trend	Net public capital stock (plants & equipment + railways of general government and public enterprises) / labour productivity	1931-1991	Australia; time series	LR: 0.10 (output)	This study follows the path-breaking study by Lau and Sin (1997) with US public capital data. The estimates tend to favour of exogenous growth function and not an endogenous one (certainly here a restricted case of the former)
<i>Roller and Waverman (2001)</i>	Cobb-Douglas for aggregate production function; Cobb-Douglas and supply functions for telecom investments	Penetration rate (main lines per capita) / GDP (in 1987 USD)	1971-1990	21 OECD countries	Contribution to GDP growth (about one third). Results similar in size as early literature on public infra provision for telecom services but they are much larger when threshold of universal service is exceeded	Control with fixed country effects mitigates the effect of unobserved factors. No account made use of price and waiting list data telecom.
<i>Caldesin and Servén (2002)</i>	Cobb-Douglas	Total physical stocks of roads & rail combined; electricity and telecom / GDP (in 1990 PPP USD).	1960-1997	101 industrial and developing countries	Positive and significant growth contributions of physical and human capital and all time infrastructure asset types	Calculation elasticities only for Latin-American countries as it requires cost share data. The estimates for their infra elasticities have similar size for the various types. Few "outside" control variables collected (urban population, pop density).
<i>Canning and Pedroni (2004, 2008)</i>	Barro stochastic growth model (Cobb-Douglas prod function combined with specific capital accumulation functions relating investment to fixed output shares, rewritten into a LR level estimation equation)	Total physical stocks of roads; electricity and telecom / GDP (in 2000 PPP)	1950-1992	Panel, 43 to 67 countries (exact number not reported)	On average countries are close to optimal level of infra provision for roads and telecom and under-provision for electricity (hence no growth impacts exceeding LR effect). The average hides strong variation over countries and infra type (with indications electricity has strongest growth impact)	The growth model condenses into a "reduced form" co-integration relation between physical infra and GDP. This relation includes the effect of human resources spent on infra extension come at the expense of the other prod factors
<i>Shanks and Barnes (2008)</i>	MFP regressions (general-to-specific selection of adequate ARDL representations of co-integration relation)	Public infra capital or roads; private telecom capital / TFP or labour productivity	1974-75-2002/03	Australia; time series (model sector and indiv. industries). Large set of control variables put up for possible inclusion.	High spillover effect found for both wide public infra and just roads only (0.3 to 0.4). Smaller positive effect for telecom capital.	Authors question own estimation results, despite statistical significance: (i) implausibly high spillovers public capital & roads, (ii) telecom effect imprecise. Moreover, no account for impact spatial spillovers, measurement errors
<i>Égert, Kozicki, Sundersland (2009)</i>	Mankiw-Romer-Well exogenous growth model; similar to Barro model (see above at Canning and Pedroni, 2004) but with different capital accumulation functions and without stochastic trend in final technology	Total physical stocks of roads or motorways; rail; electricity and telecom / GDP (in 2000 PPP)	1960-2005 (at maximum); actual time series have 16-25 annual observations	24 OECD countries (with CZ, DE, HU, LU, PL and SK excluded due to data problems).	Main conclusion: estimated growth model is significant, but no common effect found of infrastructure on output growth. Electricity has significant infra-specific effects (elasticity 0.17). Robust country-specific excess effects mainly for roads and electricity. For rail and road, while telecom outcomes in doubt)	In contrast to Canning & Pedroni (2004), numerous control variables: (i) non-parametric (time trend and fixed cross-section effects), (ii) parametric (land area, human capital, total investment, tax revenues, trade openness)
<i>Bom and Ligthart (2011)</i>	Meta regression - dependent variable is the output elasticity of public capital	578 estimates collected from 68 studies	1983-2008	68 studies, 31 of them on the US; the rest on OECD countries.	Main conclusion: estimates are biased by publication bias. The authors find a short run elasticity of 0.061 and a long run elasticity of 0.14 when public capital is installed by national governments.	The authors focus on empirical studies using the Cobb-Douglas production function approach.
<i>Broyer and Gurets (2013)</i>	VAR model	Output, employment, private investment, infrastructure spending	1995-2011; Quarterly data	France, Italy, Germany and Spain	The output elasticity of public infrastructure investment ranged between 0.09 for Spain to 0.22 for Italy, with a weighted average equal to 0.17	The authors find that infrastructure investment has a higher impact on activity in economic bad times than in economic normal times
<i>World Economic Outlook (2014)</i>	VAR-VIECM, and Dynamic general equilibrium model	Electricity Generation Capacity, General Government Gross Debt, GDP, Private and public Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Quality of Roads, Real Public Capital Stock, Predicted Disbursement of Loans	1970-2013	EU, Asian, African, Pacific, South American countries	The effect varies depending if it concerns low-income developing countries or advanced/emerging market economies.	The effect varies depending if it concerns low-income developing countries or advanced/emerging market economies.

Source: Commission Services

Table A1.2: A selection of empirical studies using targeted infrastructure measures and the cost function approach

Author	Specification cost function	Infra variable / dependent variable	Period	Data	Elasticity (direct effect)	Elasticities on other production factors (indirect effects)
Keeler and Ying (1988)	Translog	Highway stock/costs trucking industry	1960 - 1988	US regions	Cost savings	Not reported
Seitz (1993)	Generalised Leontief	Length motorway system, public roads	1970 - 1989	West Germany, 31 2-digit industries, pooled industry-specific effects	Cost savings	Substitute for labour (-0,0004) Complement for capital (0,03 to 0,04)
Nadiri and Mamuneas (1996)	Normalised symmetric MacFadden	Highway capital stock	1950 - 1989	US, 35 2-digit industries; Pooled cross-section	On aggregate: -0,04 (costs) 0,04 to 0,06 (output)	Substitute for labour. Complement for capital
Khanam (1996)	Translog	Total core capital and highway capital stock	1961 -1994	Canada, Aggregate and provincial levels	Cost savings	Substitute for labour Complement for capital
Nadiri and Mamuneas (1998)	Translog	Highway capital stock; Other capital stock	1950 - 1991	US, 35 2-digit industries; Pooled cross-section	On aggregate: -0,08 (costs); 0,08 (output)	Substitute for labour. Complement for capital. (significant contributions to productivity growth, but with a steep decline over time)
Sturn (2001)	Modified generalised symmetric MacFadden	Net stock of public grounds, roads & waterways (in value terms, derived through PIM)	1952 -1993	The Netherlands	-0,308	Substitute for labour (-0,243 ; yet not consistent over time). Substitute for capital (-0,526)

Source: Commission Services

APPENDIX 2

Building an infrastructure database

The infrastructure database has been built from Canning and Farahani (2007). In order to cope with the limited time dimension available, the technique used by Canning and Farahani (2007) is adopted. In 2007, Canning and Farahani merged two datasets from the World Bank and Canning (1998) in order to build a dataset over the period 1950-2005. The authors report the ratio and difference between the two series and merge the series. When the ratio between the two series is one, they used the Canning data to fill in missing observations in the World Bank series. When the ratio is close to one (or the difference close to zero) they adjust the Canning data corrected by a proportionality factor (ratio between the datasets) to match the World Bank data for the overlapping years. When the series match in some years but not in others the authors used a year in which they match to generate overlap. When the two series differed substantially the authors reported only the data set they believe was more consistent.

For the analysis in this note, four different data sets are used in order to build the infrastructure database - Canning (1998), the World Bank World development indicators, Eurostat and Transport statistical Pocketbook 2011 (for railways only). The datasets are merged to give an estimate of infrastructure over the period 1950-2012 using the method of Canning and Farahani (2007). The series are combined in order to obtain longer time series.

The Canning dataset covers the time span 1950-1995; the World Bank covers 1980-2002 (2009 for rail) and Eurostat covers 1970-2012 (1990 for electricity). Ratios and differences between the different series from different sources are calculated in order to identify the magnitude of the discrepancies between them. Data from Canning and the World Bank are used to match the Eurostat data for the overlapping years. Canning data were used to fill in gaps in Eurostat data, as both databases are very close to each other. When this was not possible because of the lack of overlapping years, the World Bank series were used. In order to adjust the datasets, we use a proportionality factor calculated as the average of the ratios between each couple of dataset. When the ratio is close to 1, the Canning or World Bank datasets are deflated by the proportionality factor in order to match the Eurostat dataset.

Table A2.1: **Physical Infrastructure Database**

Type of infrastructure	Source	Time span
Electricity generating capacity (Mw)	Canning (1998)	1950-1995
	World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006	1980-2002
	Eurostat	1990-2012
Railways (length of line in use, km)	Canning (1998)	1950-1995
	World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011	1980-2002
	Eurostat	1990-2012
	Transport Statistical pocketbook 2011	1995-2010
Roads (length of paved roads, km)	Canning (1998)	1950-1995
	World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006	1980-2002
	Eurostat	1979/90-2012

Source: Commission Services

Table A2.2: Merged database per Member States

Country	Motorways (km)	Railways (km)	Electricity (megawatt)
AT	1965-2012. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocketbook	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
BE	1970-2010. Eurostat Compound average estimated for 1971-1974 and 1974-1978.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
BG	1968-2001. Canning + Eurostat. Compound average estimated for 1981-1984 and 1986-1989.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat
CY	1963-2012. Canning + Eurostat. Compound average estimated for 1981-1984 and 1986-1989.	No railways in use	1950-2012. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat
CZ	1980-2012. Eurostat. Compound average estimated for 1980-1989.	1990-2012. Eurostat.	1990-2012. Eurostat
DE	1970-2012. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat Average estimated 2003-2005 and 2005-2007.	1950-2012. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat
DK	1952-2009. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocketbook	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
EE	1990-2012. Eurostat.	1980-2012. Eurostat.	1991-2012. Eurostat
ES	1970-2009. Eurostat Compound average estimated for 1971-1974 and 1976-1978.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocketbook Average 2002-2004	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
FI	1965-2011. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
FR	1970-2011. Eurostat. Compound average estimated for 1971-1974 and 1974-1978.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat Average estimated 2006-2008.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
EL	1970-1994. Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
HU	1951-2001. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat	1950-2011. Canning + Transport Pocket book. Average 2001-2008.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
IE	1973-2009. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2011. Canning + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
IT	1960-1999. Canning + World Bank.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
LT	1990-2011. Eurostat.	1980-2011. Eurostat.	1990-2012. Eurostat
LU	1959-1994. Canning + Eurostat Compound average estimated for 1971-1974, 1974-1978 and 1994-1994.	1979-2011. Eurostat + Transport Pocketbook.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
LV	1990-2012. Eurostat.	1980-2012. Eurostat.	1990-2012. Eurostat
MT	1970-2008. Eurostat.	No railways in use	1950-2012. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat
NL	1963-2010. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
PL	1963-2010. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
PT	1970-1994. Eurostat.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat
RO	1990-2012. Eurostat.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + World Bank + Eurostat
SE	1959-2009. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocket book. Average 1981-1983	
SI	1990-2012. Eurostat	1980-2012. Eurostat	1991-2012. Eurostat
SK	1990-2012. Eurostat	1990-2012. Eurostat	1992-2012. Eurostat
UK	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat.	1950-2011. Canning + Eurostat + Transport Pocket book.	1950-2012. Canning + Eurostat

Source: Commission Services

APPENDIX 3

Methodology on establishing the relationship between infrastructure and growth

The relationship between GDP per capita and infrastructure provision per capita over the period 1950-2012 is examined. The objective is to see whether there is a long term relationship between both variables and how they relate to each other. For this purpose, a panel analysis is employed, consisting of three main steps: **First**, the order of integration of all variables is tested. **Second**, heterogeneous panel cointegration tests were used to investigate whether a long term relationship between the variables in question exists. **Third**, a panel based error correction model is developed in order to identify the short and long-run causal relationship between the variables examined.

Panel Unit Root Tests

The results of the LLC, IPS, Fisher-ADF, and Fisher-PP, Breitung and Hadri panel unit root tests, for each of the variable, are presented in Table A3.1. The test is performed both for the level and first difference of Electricity installed capacity (EL), GDP, and the composite indicator of road and rail (RORA).

Table A3.1: Panel unit root test results

		H0: Non-stationarity					H0: Stationarity	
		Common process		Individual process			Hadri Z-stat	Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat
		Levin, Lin & Chu t*	Breitung t-stat	IPS W-stat	ADF - Fisher	PP - Fisher		
Level								
	EL	5.601	5.919	9.351	33.033	34.523	25.819***	22.600***
	GDP	4.602	3.341	1.857	57.326	67.912	16.412***	13.509***
	RORA	-2.930***	-0.042	-1.403*	121.099***	109.521***	9.603***	9.715***
First Differences								
	EL	-12.056***		-11.521***	256.365***	278.610***	13.972***	14.759***
	GDP	-9.843***	-1.744**	-8.189***	161.400***	360.957***	6.798***	4.338***
	RORA	-28.987***	9.888***	-19.757***	534.671***	590.402***	3.820***	9.177***

Note: The optimal lag length was selected based on the SIC criterion. The null hypothesis is that the variable follows a unit root process, except for the Hadri Z-stat and the Heteroscedastic Consistent Z-stat. Probabilities for the Fisher-type tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

Source: Commission Services

The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the IPS, Fisher-ADF, and Fisher-PP tests for all variables, except for the composite indicator of road and rail infrastructure. After taking the first difference of variables, the four first tests reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level except for the Hadri tests, which still indicate that all series remain non-stationary. Thus, the results are fairly conclusive and indicate that all variables are non-stationary in levels, and become stationary only in first differences, which mean that they are integrated of order one or I(1).

Panel Cointegration Tests

The next step involves the test for cointegration of the variables in question based on the heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques developed by Pedroni (1999) and Kao (1999). According to Pedroni (1999) the following general specification can be used to test for cointegration. It allows for heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across cross-sections:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta_i t + G'_{it} b + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

where i stands for cross-sections, t for time periods and α_i and δ_i are individual and trend effects, respectively, Y_{it} is the GDP per capita and G_{it} is the infrastructure provision per capita. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the residuals e_{it} will be I(1). The Kao test follows the same basic approach as the Pedroni tests, but specifies cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on the first-stage regressors.

Table A3.2 reports the within and between dimensions of the panel cointegration tests and the Kao's test. The results of heterogeneous panel tests indicate that the null of no cointegration between GDP and electricity infrastructure can be rejected at the 1% significance levels only for the within-dimension Pedroni's (2004) tests and for the Kao's test. Similarly, the panel v-statistic and ADF-statistic (within dimension) reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between GDP and road and rail infrastructure at 1% and 5% significance level. The same conclusion is derived by the Kao's test for the same relationship and at 10% significance level. However, contrary to the relationship of GDP with electricity infrastructure, the between-dimension test and in particular the group ADF-statistic implies that individual coefficients can be estimated in inland transport.

Table A3.2: Pedroni and Kao residual cointegration test results

	GDP- ELECTRICITY	GDP- ROAD&RAIL
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)		
	Statistic	Statistic
Panel v-Statistic	2.792***	6.032***
Panel rho-Statistic	-2.241***	1.384
Panel PP-Statistic	-4.058***	0.070
Panel ADF-Statistic	-3.914***	-1.909**
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension)		
Group rho-Statistic	0.991	1.903
Group PP-Statistic	-0.749	-0.621
Group ADF-Statistic	-1.015	-3.024***
Kao's test (ADF)	-2.638***	-1.449*

Note: The null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. Under the null hypothesis, all the statistics are distributed as standard normal distribution. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

Source: Commission Services

The long-run equilibrium is then estimated using the FMOLS and DOLS technique ⁽⁵¹⁾ (Table A3.3). Results of panel FMOLS and DOLS indicate that GDP is correlated with electricity installed capacity and the composite indicator of road and rail infrastructure, while a positive time trend is significant in both equations. All of the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% levels, implying that there is a strong long-run relationship between GDP and EL (Electricity) and GDP and RORA (Road and Rail) based on both approaches: FMOLS and DOLS.

Table A3.3: Panel FMOLS and DOLS long-run estimates

Variable	Dependent Variable:GDP	
	$GDP_{it} = \alpha + \gamma * t + b * EL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$	$GDP_{it} = \alpha + \gamma * t + b * RORA_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$
FMOLS b-Coeff.	0.250***	0.189***
Constant (a)	21.180***	20.585***
Trend (t)	0.019***	0.025***
R ²	97.00%	97.80%
DOLS b-Coeff.	0.255***	0.211***

Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

FMOL: Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares

DOLS: Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares

Source: Commission Services

Panel Granger Causality Tests

Once a long-run relationship between the variables examined has been identified, this relationship is used to estimate a panel error correction model, with the same specifications as in the co-integration tests. This

⁽⁵¹⁾ It is important to note again that the DOLS method has the drawback of reducing the number of degrees of freedom by including leads and lags in the variables studied, leading to less robust estimates. Hence, the DOLS estimation method is used to confirm the general trend and direction of the causality obtained by the FMOLS method.

will indicate the direction of the causal relationship of the variables in question, both in the long and short-run. Thus, the residuals of the lon-run model (equation 1) are included as regressors in the dynamic error correction model, which is specified as follows:

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha_{1i} + \lambda_1 EC_{it-1} + \sum_{k=0}^q \beta_{11ik} \Delta Y_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \beta_{12ik} \Delta G_{it-k} + u_{1it} \quad (2)$$

$$\Delta G_{it} = \alpha_{2i} + \lambda_2 EC_{it-1} + \sum_{k=0}^q \beta_{21ik} \Delta Y_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^q \beta_{22ik} \Delta G_{it-k} + u_{2it} \quad (3)$$

Where Δ represents the difference operator, EC is the lagged error correction term derived from the long-run model (equation 1), α_i, λ_i and β_i are the coefficients, u_{it} is the error of the equations, Y_{it} is the GDP per capita, G_{it} is the infrastructure provision per capita and k is the number of lags based on Schwarz information criterion.

The direction of the causal relationship will be determined by the results of the Granger causality test. Hence, the short-run causal relationship between GDP and infrastructure provision will be identified by testing the significance of the coefficients ($\beta_{21,i}$) of the lagged differences of Y in equation (3) and respectively of coefficients ($\beta_{12,i}$) of the lagged differences of G_{it} in equation (2). Similarly, the long-run causality will be established by looking at the significance of the coefficient of the error term in each equation i.e. λ_1 and λ_2 in equation (2) and (3), respectively. For strong exogeneity of variable G , the joint hypothesis of $H_0: \beta_{21,i} = \lambda_1 = 0$ is tested against the alternative and of variable Y the joint hypothesis of $H_0: \beta_{12,i} = \lambda_2 = 0$.

Table A3.4: Panel causality test results

Exogenous Variables	Dependent Variables		Exogenous Variables	Dependent Variables	
	D(GDP)	D(EL)		D(GDP)	D(RORA)
$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-1))$	0.436***	0.068	$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-1))$	0.454***	-0.025
$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-2))$	-0.013	-0.204***	$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-2))$	-0.020	0.037
$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-3))$	0.082***	0.095			
$\Delta(\text{GDP}(-4))$	0.059**	0.071			
$\Delta(\text{EL}(-1))$	0.028*	0.144***	$\Delta(\text{RORA}(-1))$	-0.018	0.035
$\Delta(\text{EL}(-2))$	0.002	0.078***	$\Delta(\text{RORA}(-2))$	0.011	0.055
$\Delta(\text{EL}(-3))$	0.017	0.170***			
$\Delta(\text{EL}(-4))$	0.003	0.003			
C	0.009***	0.018***	C	0.015***	0.008***
ECt-1	-0.091***	0.071***	ECt-1	-0.160***	0.025
Granger causality tests					
Short-run (Weak Exog.)	6.075	18.24***	Weak Exog.	1.52	0.4
Long-run (Strict Exog.)	79.359***	33.59***	Strict Exog.	105.66***	1.37
R ²	21.10%	11.00%		25.50%	0%

Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.

Source: Commission Services

The results of the VECM ⁽⁵²⁾ are presented in Table A3.4. According to these, the GDP has a mixed (positive and negative sign) and statistically significant impact in the short-run on electricity infrastructure, whereas the coefficients of electricity infrastructure are statistically insignificant in the equation where the GDP is the dependent variable. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the error correction term in both equations suggests that both GDP and electricity infrastructure respond to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The short-run causality tests imply that there is a unidirectional causality relationship from GDP to electricity infrastructure, while the long-run causality tests (joint hypothesis including short and long-run coefficients) indicate that there is a bi-directional causal relationship. Hence, in light of the short and long-run tests only electricity infrastructure can be considered as weakly exogenous variable in the model.

⁽⁵²⁾ The significance of causality tests are determined by the Wald F-test, while the optimal lag structure of 5 and 3 years (in differences are 4 and 2) respectively for the two relationships is chosen based on the Schwarz Information Criterion.

Similar conclusions derived from the analysis of the relationship between the GDP and the composite infrastructure indicator for rail and road. Once more, the long-run causality test indicates that there is a unidirectional causal relationship from road and rail infrastructure to GDP and not vice versa. Moreover, in this relationship the variables in question do not respond to short term shocks, namely changes in their levels in the short-run. Thus, it is clear from the results that only the road and rail composite indicator can be considered as strictly exogenous in the system.

APPENDIX 4

Methodology of identifying under- and overinvestment analysis

The econometric approach is based on panel-data for 28 EU countries for the period 1995-2012.

In order to select the appropriate panel estimation technique we use a Hausman test to test the null hypothesis that the extra orthogonality conditions imposed by the random effects estimator are valid (Hausman 1978). For all types of investment, except rail investment, the test results indicate that the regressors are correlated with the disturbance terms, and thus that the fixed effects estimator would be consistent while the random effects estimator would not be. Based on this we use the fixed effects estimator.

The fixed effects model is a linear regression model in which the intercept term is allowed to vary over the cross-sectional units, in this case the Member States. The country-specific intercept terms, (i.e. the so-called country fixed effects) capture the systematic variation between countries). The general model specification is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + x'_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where y_{it} is the dependent variable for country i at time t , x'_{it} is a K -dimensional vector of macro-economic and sector-specific explanatory variables and β is a K -dimensional vector of effects of x'_{it} on y_{it} , α_i denotes the country-specific intercept for country i and ε_{it} denotes the disturbance term. We estimate this general specification for different dependent variables. The set of explanatory variables is different for different dependent variables (see Table 4.2 in section 4).

Since the estimated coefficients are identified only through the within-country variation, the difference between the observed investment rate and the model-predicted investment rate represents the deviation from a country-specific average rate (corrected for macro-economic and sector-specific conditions), i.e., it does not include any systematic deviation from the overall EU average investment rate.

The results of the panel regression analyses (Table A4.1) indicate a consistent pattern across the different investment subsectors. The road and rail use variables, indicating the traffic intensity on the road or rail, respectively, enter significantly positive in each of the four transport-based estimations. The network density variables have a positive and significant effect on the rate of investment in road infrastructure and the rate of maintenance spending on rail infrastructure. The employment rate has a positive and significant effect on the road and rail infrastructure investment rate. The industrialisation rate has a positive and significant effect on the road investment and maintenance rate. The cohesion dummy variable enters positively significant in all estimations, except for rail investment and energy.

Table A4.1: Estimation results from the panel regression analysis

	Road investment	Road maintenance	Rail investment	Rail maintenance	GFCF in energy
Road use	.12708***	.02366***	-	-	-
Rail use	-	-	.01106***	.02092***	-
Energy consumption	-	-	-	-	.01214
Industrialisation rate	.01759*	.01416***	-.00897**	.00557	-.02275**
Cohesion	.28020***	.10710***	-.00533	.11218***	.04792
Road density	.06868***	-0.00186	-	-	-
Rail density	-	-	.23566	.68647***	-
Employment rate	.00320*	.00058	.00146*	.00036	-.00302
Adjusted R2 ⁽ⁱ⁾	0.689	0.648	0.364	0.632	0.584
R2 (within)	0.301	0.106	0.053	0.200	0.020
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Number of observ.	371	312	414	289	416

***, ** and * indicate a level of significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.

(i) The adjusted R2 includes the contribution of the country fixed effects in explaining the variation in the dependent variable


Source: Commission Services

ANNEX 1


Country fiches

1. BELGIUM

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


2. BULGARIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


3. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


4. DENMARK

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


5. GERMANY

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.


Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD

6. ESTONIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


7. IRELAND

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


8. GREECE

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


9. SPAIN

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


10. FRANCE

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


11. CROATIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


12. ITALY

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


13. CYPRUS

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


14. LATVIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


15. LITHUANIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


16. LUXEMBOURG

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure



* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


17. HUNGARY

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


18. MALTA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.


Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD

19. THE NETHERLANDS

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


20. AUSTRIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


21. POLAND

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


22. PORTUGAL

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


23. ROMANIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


24. SLOVENIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


25. SLOVAKIA

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


26. FINLAND

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


27. SWEDEN

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure




* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD


28. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Inland transport and Electricity infrastructure : provision and use



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat

Investment and Maintenance pattern in Transport and Energy infrastructure



* Overinvestment and underinvestment correspond to the difference between the observed investment rate and a model-predicted rate which accounts for sectoral and macro-economic factors.

Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat and OECD