

Absolute poverty measures for the developing world, 1981–2004

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We report new estimates of measures of absolute poverty for the developing world for the period 1981–2004. A clear trend decline in the percentage of people who are absolutely poor is evident, although with uneven progress across regions. We find more mixed success in reducing the total number of poor. Indeed, the developing world outside China has seen little or no sustained progress in reducing the number of poor, with rising poverty counts in some regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa. There are encouraging signs of progress in all regions after 2000, although it is too early to say whether this is a new trend. We also summarize results from estimating a new series incorporating an allowance for the higher cost of living facing poor people in urban areas. This reveals a marked urbanization of poverty in the developing world, which is stronger in some regions than others, although it remains that three-quarters of the poor live in rural areas.

development | urbanization | surveys

Progress against absolute poverty is a widely accepted yardstick for assessing the overall performance of developing economies. The best data for assessing progress against poverty come from surveys of the living standards of nationally representative samples of households. The last 25 years has seen great progress in the production and availability of such data for developing countries, thanks to the efforts of national statistics agencies throughout the world and the support of the donor community and international development agencies.

Drawing on these data, this article provides internally consistent estimates of a time series of measures of absolute poverty for the developing world, and by region, at \approx 3-yearly intervals from 1981 to 2004. We use data from >500 household surveys spanning 100 countries. We follow exactly the methods outlined in ref. 1, which was the last update of the World Bank's "global" poverty measures, providing estimates up to 2002. A key feature of these methods is that international poverty lines are used, which are intended to have a fixed purchasing power, both across countries, as measured by existing purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, and, over time, as measured by existing national Consumer Price Indices. Thus, our attention is confined to absolute poverty measures in which simply moving individuals between dates or countries, with no absolute loss in their real consumption, cannot increase the aggregate measure of poverty.^b

In addition to including new data available since 2004, we have recalculated all prior estimates back to 1981 to incorporate any updates or revisions from past data sources. The article also notes the implications of incorporating an urban–rural poverty line differential into the global poverty estimates, drawing on ref. 4. This is of interest, given popular concerns about the urbanization of the developing world's population and (one expects) of poverty.

The article begins by reviewing the assumptions and methods and then presents and discusses the results.

Measuring Poverty in the Developing World

We rely heavily on nationally representative household surveys for measuring poverty. This is one of the purposes for which these surveys exist. There is no alternative to the use of survey data for measuring the distribution of relative consumptions or

incomes, "inequality" for short. But there is an alternative source of data on average consumption, namely the national accounts (NAS).^c (Given certain assumptions, one can derive standard poverty measures from the mean and a suitable inequality measure.) We use NAS data in some aspects of our estimation methods, notably in dealing with the fact that different countries do their surveys on different dates, and we want to line them up in time to a common reference date. However, we do not let the NAS data override the survey mean when both are known. In other words, we use the survey at the survey date. In this respect, we follow the standard, although not universal, practice in the literature on poverty measurement.

Advocates of replacing the survey mean by the NAS estimate of national income or consumption per capita argue that household surveys underestimate mean income or consumption because of deliberate underreporting and selective compliance with random samples. However, it is not clear that the NAS data can provide a more accurate measure of mean household welfare than the survey data that were collected for that purpose. As typically measured in practice, NAS "private consumption" includes institutional and other attributed consumption as well as personal consumption, as relevant to measuring poverty. And, even acknowledging the problems of income underreporting and selective survey compliance, there can be no presumption that the discrepancies between survey means and the NAS aggregates (such as private consumption per person) are distribution-neutral; more plausibly, the main reasons why surveys underestimate consumption or income would also lead them to underestimate inequality.^d Furthermore, the NAS-means method is clearly unacceptable when doing an urban–rural split of global poverty measures, allowing for cost-of-living (COL) differences, because neither the inequality measures nor the NAS means would then be valid.

Also following past practice, "poverty" is assessed here by using household per capita expenditure on consumption.^e The measures

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Abbreviations: COL, cost of living; EAP, East Asia and Pacific; ECA, East Central Asia; LAC, Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA, Middle East and North Africa; NAS, national accounts; PA, poverty assessment; PPP, purchasing power parity; SAS, South Asia; SSA, sub-Saharan Africa.

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^bThe theoretical arguments for and against this approach are discussed in ref. 2. Relative poverty measures for the developing world can be found in refs. 1 and 3.

^cExamples include refs. 5 and 6.

^dFor example, ref. 7 attributes up to 40% of the difference between the (higher) growth of gross domestic product per capita and (lower) growth of mean household per capita consumption from household surveys in India to unreported increase in the incomes of the rich. Selective compliance with random samples could well be an equally important source of bias, although the sign is theoretically ambiguous; ref. 8 provides evidence on the impact of selective nonresponse for the U.S.

^eThe use of a per capita normalization is standard in the literature on developing countries. This stems from the general presumption that there is rather little scope for economies of size in consumption for poor people. However, that assumption can be questioned; see ref. 9.

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Table 2. Number of people (in millions) living below \$1.08 a day

Region	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2004
EAP	796.40	564.30	428.76	476.22	420.22	279.09	276.54	226.77	169.13
China	633.66	425.27	310.43	374.33	334.21	211.44	222.78	176.61	128.36
ECA	3.00	2.27	1.61	2.16	16.94	20.87	17.90	6.01	4.42
LAC	39.35	50.90	50.00	44.60	38.83	42.96	49.03	48.13	47.02
MNA	8.81	7.26	6.41	5.26	4.53	4.38	5.67	4.88	4.40
SAS	455.18	445.05	471.14	479.10	436.74	452.91	463.40	469.55	446.20
India	363.72	359.41	368.60	376.44	376.14	378.91	376.25	377.84	370.67
SSA	167.53	199.78	222.80	240.34	252.26	286.21	296.07	296.11	298.30
Total	1,470.28	1,269.56	1,180.73	1,247.68	1,170.17	1,087.81	1,108.61	1,051.46	969.48
Total excluding China	836.62	844.29	870.30	873.35	835.96	876.37	885.83	874.85	841.12

Source: authors' calculations. The set of countries are the Part 2 member countries of the World Bank, essentially all low- and middle-income countries, which the Bank currently defines as having average gross domestic product per capita for the period 2004–2006 of no more than \$11,115; see ref. 10.

assessments (PAs), which have now been done for most developing countries. These are core reports within the Bank's program of analytic work at country level; each report describes the extent of poverty and its causes in that country. The PAs are clearly the best available source of information on urban–rural differentials for setting international poverty lines. In almost all cases, the PA poverty lines were constructed by using some version of the cost-of-basic-needs method.^j This aims to approximate a COL index that reflects the differences in prices faced between urban and rural areas, weighted by the consumption patterns of people living in a neighborhood of the country-specific poverty line.

However, although our method appears to be the best option that is currently feasible, internal consistency is questionable if the urban–rural COL differential varies by income, for then the differential from the PA may not be right for the international poverty lines. If the COL differential tends to rise with income, then we will tend to overestimate urban poverty by the \$1 a day line in middle-income countries, given that the PA poverty line will tend to be above the international line for most middle-income countries.

We used the ratio of the urban poverty line to the rural line from the PA (generally the one closest to 1993 if there is more than one) to obtain an urban poverty line for each country corresponding to its PPP-adjusted \$1 a day rural line. On average, the urban poverty line is $\approx 30\%$ higher than the rural line, although there are marked differences between countries, with a tendency for the differential to be higher in poorer countries (3), which is consistent with one's expectation that transport costs and other impediments to internal market integration are higher in poor countries.

The urban population data are from the latest available issue of the United Nations' *World Urbanization Prospects* (WUP) (15). There are undoubtedly differences in the definitions used between countries, which we can do little about here (for further discussion see refs. 16 and 3). The WUP estimates are based on actual enumerations whenever they are available. The WUP web site provides details on data sources and how specific cases were handled; see <http://esa.un.org/unup/>.

Naturally, the surveys are scattered over time. We estimate the poverty measures for nine "reference years" 1981, 1984, 1987, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2004 (adding 2004 to the years reported in ref. 1, although revising all past estimates as well). Our estimates for the urban–rural breakdown are for 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. To estimate regional poverty at a given reference year we "line up" the surveys in time using the same method described in ref. 1. The latter article also describes our interpolation method when the reference date is between two surveys.

^jThe precise method used varies from country to country, depending on the data available. For more information on the alternative methods found in practice, see ref. 11.

Results

Tables 1–4 give our aggregate results for the two poverty lines and for both the headcount index (Tables 1 and 3) and the absolute number of poor judged against each line (Tables 2 and 3). These follow our past methods for global poverty measurement, as summarized above, without an allowance for the higher COL in urban areas. Table 5 gives the results of the urban and rural poverty measures for 1993 and 2002, which we discuss later.

Aggregating across regions, we find trend declines in the headcount indices; for both lines, the trend is $\approx 0.8\%$ points per year for the period 1981–2004.^k The number of people living below \$1 a day has also declined (Table 2), and fell below 1 billion for the first time in 2004. However, progress has been slower for the \$2 line. The number of people living below the \$2 line actually rose over most of the period, only falling briefly in the mid-1990s and since the end of the 1990s. Based on Tables 3 and 4, we can derive the population growth rates for the three groups: those living under \$1 a day, those living between \$1 and \$2, and those living over \$2; the annual exponential growth rates (obtained by regressing the log population on time) for these three groups are -1.4% , 1.9% , and 3.5% , respectively (with standard errors of 0.2% , 0.4% , and 0.1%).

China naturally carries the largest weight in these calculations (which also points to the likely sensitivity of global poverty aggregates to measurement errors in the data for China). Tables 1–4 also give our estimates excluding China. The trend rates of decline in the headcount indices are approximately halved when one focuses on the developing world outside China.^l When we exclude China, we find a fairly static picture in terms of the number of people living under \$1 a day, with no clear trend, and a clear trend increase in the number of poor by the \$2-a-day poverty line, which shows little sign of the possible reversal after 2000, indicated by the series including China (Table 4). Of course, this static picture overall for the developing world outside China hides both gains and losses at the country level, which roughly balanced in the aggregate. The aggregate pattern of population growth rates across the three income groups, under \$1, between \$1 and \$2, and over \$2, changes radically when we focus on the developing world outside China. We now find annual growth rates of 0.1% (SE = 0.1%), 2.4% (0.2), and 2.5% (0.1), respectively.

It should also be noted that some features of the overall series also reflect events in China. The sharp reduction in the poverty count in the early 1980s (particularly for the lower line) is largely because of China; over 200 million fewer people are found to have

^kThe regression coefficients on time are -0.83 (SE = 0.09) and -0.77 (SE = 0.05) for \$1 and \$2, respectively. Note that this trend rate of poverty reduction is more than the rate of 0.6% points per year that would be more than enough to halve the 1990 \$1-a-day poverty rate by 2015, which is the first of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals.

^lThe regression coefficients on time are -0.45 (SE = 0.03) and -0.28 (SE = 0.03) for \$1 and \$2, respectively.

Table 4. Numbers of people (in millions) living below \$2.15 a day

Region	1981	1984	1987	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2004
EAP	1,169.74	1,115.97	1,040.71	1,112.93	1,083.21	907.83	882.70	766.26	683.83
China	875.77	819.11	744.07	819.11	802.86	649.47	627.55	524.24	452.25
ECA	19.78	17.38	14.03	20.07	77.83	84.88	87.94	60.75	46.25
LAC	103.90	125.58	122.30	114.85	111.08	122.30	128.44	131.14	120.62
MNA	50.56	48.62	50.24	48.91	51.80	55.40	64.50	60.92	59.13
SAS	813.04	852.39	904.21	953.00	973.99	1,031.48	1,067.15	1,115.54	1,115.77
India	624.92	658.92	694.71	733.13	767.39	798.07	825.93	853.32	867.62
SSA	295.46	332.87	365.02	396.32	422.11	458.37	490.58	512.62	522.34
Total	2,452.47	2,492.81	2,496.50	2,646.09	2,721.72	2,665.66	2,721.31	2,647.22	2,547.94
Total excluding China	1,576.70	1,673.70	1,752.42	1,826.98	1,918.86	2,016.19	2,093.75	2,122.98	2,095.69

Source: authors' calculations.

relative difference in poverty rates between the two sectors. The contrast between China and India is particularly striking. Poverty incidence in urban China in 2002 was barely 4% of the rural rate, whereas it was 90% for India (3). Urban poverty incidence in China is unusually low relative to rural, although problems in the available data (notably in the fact that recent migrants to urban areas are undercounted in the urban surveys) are probably leading us to underestimate the urban share of the poor in that country (for further discussion, see ref. 17).

We find that the urban share of the poor is lowest in East Asia (6.6% of the \$1-a-day poor lived in urban areas in 2002), due, in large part, to China. The urban share of the poor is highest in Latin America, where 59% of the \$1-a-day poor, and 66% of the \$2-a-day poor lived in urban areas in 2002. This is the only region in which more of the \$1-a-day poor live in urban than rural areas (the switch occurred in the mid-1990s).

In the aggregate and in most regions, we find that poverty incidence fell in both urban and rural sectors over the period as a whole (although with greater progress against rural poverty in the aggregate). LAC and SSA are exceptions. There rising urban poverty came with falling rural poverty. The (poverty-reducing)

population shift and rural components for LAC and SSA were offset by the (poverty-increasing) urban component.

Although the urban poverty rate for the developing world as a whole was relatively stagnant over time for \$1 a day, this is not true in all regions. Indeed, the urban poverty rate is falling relative to the national rate in both East Asia and ECA, attenuating the urbanization of poverty; indeed, in ECA the urban share of the poor is actually falling over time (a "ruralization" of poverty) even while the urban share of the total population has risen, although only slightly. (There is the hint of a ruralization of \$2-a-day poverty in East Asia from the late 1990s, again because of China.) The ruralization of poverty in ECA is not surprising, because it is consistent with other evidence suggesting that the economic transition process in this region has favored urban areas over rural areas (18). This has also been the case in China since the mid-1990s (17).

South Asia shows no trend in either direction in the urban poverty rate relative to the national rate, and the region has also had a relatively low overall urbanization rate, with little sign of a trend increase in the urban share of the poor. The population shift component of poverty reduction is also relatively less important in South Asia.

Table 5. Urban and rural poverty measures for 1993 and 2002 using the \$1.08-a-day poverty line

	Number of poor (in millions)			Headcount index, %			Urban share of the poor, %	Urban share of population, %
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total		
1993								
EAP	28.71	407.17	435.88	5.55	35.47	26.17	6.59	31.09
China	10.98	331.38	342.36	3.33	39.05	29.05	3.21	29.77
ECA	6.12	6.37	12.49	2.06	3.66	2.65	48.98	63.06
LAC	26.07	28.55	54.62	7.82	22.38	11.85	47.73	72.33
MNA	0.77	4.29	5.07	0.61	3.76	2.09	15.29	52.82
SAS	107.48	383.30	490.78	35.30	43.55	41.43	21.90	25.70
India	94.28	324.55	418.83	40.06	48.88	46.57	22.51	26.17
SSA	66.42	206.73	273.15	40.21	53.07	49.24	24.32	29.78
Total	235.58	1,036.41	1,271.99	13.50	36.58	27.78	18.52	38.12
Total excluding China	224.60	705.03	929.63	15.86	35.53	27.34	24.16	41.64
2002								
EAP	16.27	223.23	239.50	2.28	19.83	13.03	6.79	38.79
China	4.00	175.01	179.01	0.80	22.44	13.98	2.24	37.68
ECA	2.48	4.94	7.42	0.83	2.87	1.57	33.40	63.45
LAC	38.33	26.60	64.93	9.49	21.15	12.26	59.03	76.24
MNA	1.21	4.88	6.09	0.75	3.82	2.11	19.87	55.75
SAS	125.40	394.34	519.74	32.21	39.05	37.15	24.13	27.83
India	106.64	316.42	423.06	36.20	41.96	40.34	25.21	28.09
SSA	98.84	228.77	327.61	40.38	50.86	47.17	30.17	35.24
Total	282.52	882.77	1165.29	12.78	29.32	22.31	24.24	42.34
Total excluding China	278.52	707.76	986.28	16.28	31.72	25.02	28.24	43.40

Source: ref. 3.

